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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a young girl signs on to the Internet after school to learn
about her favorite pop music star, Britney Spears. Instead of typing
www.BritneySpears.com, she inadvertently omits the final "s" and types
www.BritneySpear.com. While she expects a web site featuring the
pop star's personal biography and photographs, the young girl is di-
rected to a pornographic web site and graphic images appear on her
computer screen. To make matters worse, when she tries to close the
web browser, pop-up advertisements for credit cards, discount travel
packages, and adult web sites endlessly barrage her screen. This un-
suspecting teenager has just become a victim of "typosquatting," and
the owner of the misspelled web site has profited from the girl's
mistake. 1
As of September 2001, 143 million Americans were using the In-
ternet, including 75 percent of young adults between the ages of four-
teen and seventeen and 65 percent of children between the ages of
ten and thirteen. 2 Ten million customers shopped for a product on
I See generally Press Release, United States Attorney, Southern District of New York,
'Cyberscammer' Pleads Guilty to Federal Charges of Using Deceptive Internet Names to
Mislead Minors to X-Rated Sites (Dec. 10, 2003) [hereinafter Zuccarini Plea] (explaining
that investigators for the United States Postal Inspection Service accessed pornographic
web sites and pop-up advertisements when they typed into a web browser common mis-
spellings of domain names popular with children), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
usao/nys/Press%20Releases/December3/ZUCCARINIPLEAPR.pdf.
2 See Namita E. Mani, Legal Update, Judicial Scrutiny of Congressional Attempts to Protect
Children From the Internet's Harms: Will Internet Filtering Technology Provide the Answer Congress
Has Been Looking For? 9 B.U.J. Sci. & TECH. L. 201, 201 (2003) (citing NAT'L TELECOMM. &
INFO. ADMIN., A NATION ONLINE: How AMERICANS ARE EXPANDING THEIR USE OF THE IN-
TERNET 1 (2002), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/dn/anationonline2.pdf
(last visited Feb. 7, 2004)). Approximately 445 to 533 million people use the Internet
worldwide. See Mitchell P. Goldstein, Congress and the Courts Battle Over the First Amendment:
Can the Law Really Protect Children from Pornography on the Internet?, 21 J. MARSHALL J. COM-
PUTER & INFO. L. 141, 143 (2003).
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the Internet in 1998,3 resulting in a staggering $102 billion in e-com-
merce. 4 Because the Internet is so profitable and influential, many
corporations, celebrities, and nonprofit organizations have designed
web sites.5 People and businesses use web sites for a variety of pur-
poses, including to advertise and provide information about products
and services, 6 to access global markets without investing substantial
sums in retail storefronts, 7 to present lengthy documents and position
papers that would otherwise be prohibitively expensive to distribute in
paper form,8 to publicize views on candidates for political office and
political issues,9 and to network with like-minded individuals.'0
In order to access a site on the World Wide Web, an individual
types a unique domain name into an Internet browser." Legitimate
domain names are frequently identical to the name of a corporation
or a celebrity, such as McDonalds.com or JustinTimberlake.com, be-
cause making the domain name mirror the organization's name facili-
tates easy access. 12 Consequently, obtaining a domain name similar or
3 Cybersquatting and Consumer Protection: Ensuring Domain Name Integrity: Hearing on S.
1255 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 1 (1999) [hereinafter Hearings]
(opening statement of Hon. Spencer Abraham, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
4 Id. at9.
5 See Christina M. Lemon, Note, Internet Domain Names, Cybersquatting, and the Right of
Publicity: Where Does the Right Belong in Cyberspace? 24 WHrrrIER L. REV. 291, 293-94 (2002).
6 See, e.g., State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 343 F.3d
249, 252 (4th Cir. 2003) (discussing a web site used for advertising); Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v.
Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 494 (2d Cir. 2000) (same).
7 See, e.g., CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1262 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting
that the Internet "enables anyone with the right equipment and knowledge... to operate
an international business cheaply, and from a desktop").
8 See, e.g., Info. Handling Servs., Inc. v. Def. Automated Printing Servs., 338 F.3d
1024, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (discussing an Internet database of government documents);
Simon v. Philip Morris, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 95, 100-01 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (referencing a
university library web site that publishes substantial tobacco company documents).
9 See, e.g., Ariz. Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Bayless, 320 F.3d 1002, 1009
(9th Cir. 2003) (observing that "political communications are increasingly being mass dis-
tributed via the Internet"); McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 646
(D.D.C. 2003) (describing an organization utilizing web site to disseminate its view of polit-
ical candidates); Am. Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682, 686 (N.D. Ohio
2002) (discussing political candidates' commercials on the Internet). See generally BRUCE
BIMBER & RICHARD DAVIS, CAMPAIGNING ONLINE: THE INTERNET IN U.S. ELECTIONS (2003)
(outlining the role of the Internet in elections).
10 See UNDERSTANDING THE WEB: SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF THE
INTERNET 52 (Alan B. Albarran & David H. Goffeds., 2000) (observing that "[t]he Internet
has bonded groups worldwide into virtual communities by generating greater dialogue
between like-minded groups and individuals").
I I For a detailed discussion of the structure of the Internet and how domain names
operate, see Timothy Marsh, Note, Shields v. Zuccarini: The Role of the Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act in Fighting Typosquatting, 33 U. TOL. L. REv. 683, 684-86 (2002). See
also William Black, The Domain Name System, in LAW & THE INTERNET: A FRAMEWORK FOR
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 125, 125-32 (Lilian Edwards & Charlotte Waelde eds., 2d ed. 2000)
(explaining the domain name system).
12 See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1327 (9th Cir. 1998).
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identical to the corporation, organization, or individual's name is im-
portant so that interested individuals can readily find authentic
information. 13
Cybersquatters, 14 individuals who register domain names solely to
resell them at substantially inflated prices, also recognize the pre-
mium placed on popular domain names.1 5 During the early years of
the Internet, opportunistic cyber-speculators registered popular do-
main names hoping to profit when the legitimate entity wanted to es-
tablish a web presence.1 6 Because domain name registration occurs
on a first-come, first-served basis and does not require an independent
investigation establishing the registrant's legitimate interest in a re-
quested domain name,17 cybersquatters purchased and held for ran-
13 See id. (rejecting the defendant's argument that "a domain name is nothing more
than an address" and stating that "[a] significant purpose of a domain name is to identify
the entity that owns the web site"); Cardservice Int'l, Inc. v. McGee, 950 F. Supp. 737, 741
(E.D. Va. 1997) (noting that "[a] customer who is unsure about a company's domain name
will often guess that the domain name is also the company's name"); MTV Networks v.
Curry, 867 F. Supp. 202, 203-04 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (observing that "[a] domain name
mirroring a corporate name may be a valuable corporate asset, as it facilitates communica-
tion with a customer base"); see also Peter Brown, New Issues in Internet Litigation, in 17TH
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON COMPUTER LAw: THE EVOLVING LAW OF THE INTEREST-COMMERCE,
FREE SPEECH, SECURITY, OBSCENITY AND ENTERTAINMENT 151, 156 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks, and Literary Property Course, Handbook Series No. G4-3987, 1997) (noting
that
[t]he domain name serves a dual purpose. It marks the location of the site
within cyberspace, much like a postal address in the real world, but it may
also indicate to users some information as to the content of the site, and, in
instances of well-known trade names or trademarks, may provide informa-
tion as to the origin of the contents of the site.
); Martin B. Schwimmer, Domain Names & the Commercial Market, in TRADEMARK LAw & THE
INTERNET: ISSUES, CASE LAW, AND PRACTICE Tips 7, 19 (Lisa E. Cristal & Neal S. Greenfield
eds., 2d ed. 2001) (discussing the "dot com assumption that a company named XYZ would
be located at xyz.com").
14 Senator Orrin Hatch defined cybersquatting as "the deliberat[e], bad-faith, and
abusive registration of Internet domain names in violation of the rights of trademark own-
ers .... What we are talking about is basically fraud, deception, and the bad-faith trading
on the goodwill of others." Hearings, supra note 3, at 3 (prepared statement of Hon. Orrin
G. Hatch, Chairman, S. Comm. on the judiciary).
15 See Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 870 (6th Cir. 2002) (describing how an alleged
cybersquatter registered a domain name and posted it for auction the following day);
Stacey H. King, The "Law That It Deems Applicable": ICANN, Dispute Resolution, and the Problem
of Cybersquatting, 22 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 453, 455 (2000) (citing cybersquatting as
the root of many domain name disputes with trademark holders). Cybersquatting is also
known as "domain name hijacking." See IANJ. LLOYD, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LAw 461
(3d ed. 2000).
16 See LLOYD, supra note 15, at 461 (noting that domain names "such as Macdonalds
[sic], Hertz and Rolex were issued to applicants with no connection with the well known
firms").
17 See Register.Com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 415-16 (2d Cir. 2004); Storey v.
Cello Holdings, L.L.C., 347 F.3d 370, 372-73 (2d Cir. 2003); Watts v. Network Solutions,
Inc., 202 F.3d 276 (7th Cir. 1999) (table), available at 1999 WAL 994012, at *1.
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som thousands of popular domain names until the legitimate
corporation or celebrity was willing to pay the extortionate price.'"
Cybersquatters were not alone in their desire to capitalize on the
success of popular web sites.' 9 Typosquatting, an unlawful activity that
aims to profit by exploiting weaknesses in the domain name system,
entails identifying legitimate popular web sites and purposefully regis-
tering deceptively similar or deliberately misspelled domain names in
order to lure visitors into visiting unrelated-and often porno-
graphic2 0-web sites.2 ' For example, an unsuspecting viewer, often a
child, who inadvertently types "www.whitehouse. corn" instead of "www.
whitehouse.gov" into a web browser is exposed to the site of a typos-
quatter that features explicit pornography instead of the official White
House web site. 22 Typosquatters profit from this conduct because
18 Imposing the duty to register a domain name on every top level domain worldwide
may present practical difficulties. See DIANE ROWLAND & ELIZABETH MACDONALD, INFORMA-
TION TECHNOLOGY LAW 520-21 (2d ed. 2000) (observing that "in practice, few companies
will be prepared to register their names in all registries around the world... and indeed
may not be eligible under local rules") (citing Dawn Osborne, Domain Names, Registration
and Dispute Resolution and Recent UK Cases, 19 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 644 (1997)). Some
domain name registrars argue that no property rights inhere in domain names, and that
"whoever 'settled' it first" obtains the exclusive right to exploit the domain name. King,
supra note 15, at 455. Furthermore, domain name registrars and cybersquatters often ar-
gue that trademark holders should have protected their interests by registering the domain
name earlier. Id.
19 See generally Compl., United States v. Zuccarini, No. 03 Cr. 275 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29,
2003) [hereinafter Zuccarini Complaint] (alleging criminal acts of typosquatting against
John Zuccarini), available at http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/cyberlaw/uszuccarini829
03cmp.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).
20 Obtaining precise statistics regarding the proliferation and availability of pornogra-
phy on the Internet is challenging. A Spring 2000 random survey of Internet web sites
found that 73.8% of the webservers in the sample featured adult content on the index
page. Daniel Orr & Josephine Ferrigno-Stack, Childproofing on the World Wide Web: A Survey
of Adult Webservers, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 465, 470 (2001). Further, only 11% included age
verification or a disclaimer on the index page without presenting adult content on the
same page. See id.
21 See, e.g., Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Allporsche.com, 215 F.3d 1320, (Table) (4th
Cir. 2000) (providing an example of a trademark holder suing typosquatters), available at
2000 WL 742185; Hearings, supra note 3, at 17-22 (listing over 300 registered domain
names based on the word "Porsche," including "PORACHE.COM," "PORCHE.NET,"
"PORS.NET," "PORSCE.COM," PORSCEH.COM," "PORSCH.COM," and "PORSCHA
GIRLS.COM").
22 Compare www.whitehouse.gov (official site of the President of the United States),
with www.whitehouse.com (pornographic web site claiming "We are the Worldwide Leader
in Adult and Political Entertainment" and that the site "has been visited by over 85 Million
people since [its] inception in 1997"). See also Mani, supra note 2, at 202 (stating that a
child who accidentally types "www.whitehouse.com" would "unintentionally encounter
graphic x-rated images").
Senator Orrin Hatch presents another example: "Take, for example, the child who in
a 'hunt-and-peck' manner mistakenly types in the domain for 'dosney.com,' looking for
the rich and family-friendly content of Disney's home page, only to wind up staring at a
page [of] hard-core pornography because someone snatched up the 'dosney' domain in
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they are able to redirect unsuspecting users to a different web site,23
create "pop-up" advertisements for third party corporations, 24 or cap-
ture credit card information from consumers who believe they are ac-
cessing a trusted web site.25 Moreover, typosquatters also profit if
owners of the legitimate domain name are willing to purchase the de-
ceptive domain name to prevent further confusion. 26
Congress responded to this widespread activity by passing the An-
ticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) in 1999.27
Couched in trademark law terms, the ACPA prohibits people from
registering distinctive trademarks as domain names in bad faith "with
the specific intent to profit from such name by selling the domain
name for financial gain to that person or any third party."28 While
protecting corporations and individuals with distinctive or trade-
marked names, the Act leaves unregulated conduct targeted at non-
distinctive sites.29 More importantly, although the ACPA eliminates
some of the jurisdictional challenges that complainants faced prior to
its enactment,30 the Act only provides remedial, injunctive relief and
the possible transfer of the infringing domain name to the legitimate
owner.
3 1
While the ACPA provides limited relief from the typosquatting
epidemic, Congress passed an even more effective weapon to combat
typosquatting in the Truth in Domain Names Act of 2003.32 As the
most aggressive legislation to date, the Truth in Domain Names Act
criminalizes the act of knowingly registering a misleading domain
name with the intent to deceive a person into viewing material consti-
anticipation that just such a mistake would be made." Hearings, supra note 3, at 4 (state-
ment of Hon. Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
23 See, e.g., Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390,
394-95 (4th Cir. 2003) (describing how pro-life advocacy organization registered multiple
derivative domain names similar to health insurance corporation's name and used the web
sites to divert Internet traffic to its own web site).
24 John Zuccarini earned between ten and twenty-five cents for every click. See Zuc-
carini Plea, supra note 1, at 4-5.
25 Hearings, supra note 3, at 5 (statement of Anne H. Chasser, President, Int'l Trade-
mark Ass'n).
26 See Benjamin Edelman, Large-Scale Registration ofDomains with Typographical Errors, at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/edelman/typo-domains (last visited Apr. 3, 2004).
27 Pub. L. No. 106-113, §§ 3001-3010, 113 Stat. 1536, 1501(A)-545 (codified as
amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 note, 1114, 1116, 1117, 1125, 1129; 16 U.S.C. § 470a; 28
U.S.C. § 1338).
28 15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A) (2000).
29 See id. § 1125(d), 1129(1)(A), (B).
30 See infra Part II.B.
31 See 15 U.S.C. § 1129.
32 Pub. L. No. 108-21 § 521, 117 Stat. 686 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252B (Supp. 1
2003)). Congress enacted the Truth in Domain Names Act as part of the Prosecutorial
Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today (PROTECT) Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650-95 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 28 and 42
U.S.C.).
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tuting obscenity. 33 The Act imposes criminal punishment on violators
in the form of a substantial fine or-the Act's most distinctive fea-
ture-imprisonment for up to two years.34 Furthermore, where the
deceptive domain name targets children, the Act doubles the term of
imprisonment to four years. 35
To enable the reader to comprehend the expansive scope of the
typosquatting epidemic, Part I of this Note outlines the basic structure
of the Internet, the process by which domain names are reserved and
allocated, and the rise of cybersquatting and typosquatting. Part II
identifies the shortcomings of the limited remedies available to vic-
tims of cybersquatting and typosquatting prior to the Truth in Do-
main Names Act, and it evaluates the way in which fragmented civil
litigation and arbitration failed to eradicate these deceptive practices.
Part III analyzes the Truth in Domain Names Act itself, and highlights
the political climate in which Congress empowered federal prosecu-
tors to indict typosquatters. Finally, Part IV argues that while the Act
represents the most forward-thinking legislation to date, the require-
ment that the derivative web site contain obscene material severely
constricts the statute's application and will likely leave substantial
typosquatting activity unregulated.
I
CYBERSQUATTING AND TYPOSQUATTING ON
THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY
A. The Structure of the Internet: A Brief Overview
The Internet is a worldwide computer network that facilitates the
rapid location of information, transcends international borders, and
transmits ideas through the use of web sites.3 6 A web site is a com-
puter data file containing information such as words, pictures, music,
videos, or links to other web sites.37
Internet service providers (ISPs) assign every computer con-
nected to the Internet a numeric Internet protocol (IP) address,
which is a unique identifier similar to a telephone number or a street
address. 38 This IP address allows individual computers to communi-
33 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252B (Supp. 1 2003).
34 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252B(a).
35 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252B(b).
36 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) (incorporating the definition of "Internet" codified at
47 U.S.C. § 230(f) (1): "the international computer network of both Federal and non-Fed-
eral interoperable packet switched data networks"); KLAUS W. GREWLICH, GOVERNANCE IN
"CYBERSPACE:" ACCESS AND PUBLIC INTEREST IN GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS 37-40 (1999)
(describing the interest as a "network of networks"). For a detailed account of the evolu-
tion of the Internet, see King, supra note 15, at 459-62.
37 Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998).
38 King, supra note 15, at 457. An example of an IP address is: 123.456.789.23. Id.
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cate with each other.3 9 Because IP addresses are often long and diffi-
cult to remember, domain names40 made up of common words are
assigned to IP addresses to permit easy access to web pages and e-mail
accounts.
4 1
These common domain names, also known as Uniform Resource
Locators (URLs) ,42 are comprised of two parts: top level and second
level domain names.43 Top level domain names, such as ".gov" for
governmental web sites, ".net" for networks, and ".com" for commer-
cial and general purpose sites, are suffixes attached to the end of the
domain name. 44 The second level domain name is the part sand-
wiched between the "www" and the top level suffix, and it is usually
identical to the person or company's popular name.45 The second
level domain name is the part of the name that frequently gives rise to
disputes. 46 Although no two domain names may be identical, the
same popular name may be registered under each of the different top
39 See id, see also INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND Nos. (ICANN), GLOSSARY,
available at http://ww.icann.org/genera/background/htm# (last visited Apr. 3, 2004).
40 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) (defining the term "domain name" as "any alphanu-
meric designation which is registered with or assigned by any domain name registrar, do-
main name registry, or other domain name registration authority as part of an electronic
address on the Internet"); Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174
F.3d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that a domain name is "somewhat analogous to a
telephone number or street address").
41 See Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 869 (6th Cir. 2002); 4 J. THOMAS MCCARI-11,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25:72 (2003); King, supra note 15, at
457-58. For a technical description of this process, see Island Online, Inc. v. Network
Solutions, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 289, 292-93 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
42 See Zuccarini Complaint, supra note 19, at 1-2.
43 For example, www.whitehouse.gov consists of the top level domain name ".com"
and the second level domain name "whitehouse."
44 Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998).
45 See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616, 618 (C.D. Cal. 1996); King,
supra note 15, at 458.
46 King, supra note 15, at 458. The First Circuit has observed:
As companies seek to incorporate their nationally registered trade-
marks into domain names that they can use to promote goods and services,
they often find that the names, or names confusingly similar, have already
been registered by individuals unconnected with the company. This occur-
rence is unsurprising because the initial domain name registration system is
a non-governmentally operated, first-come, first-served system that does not
inquire into potential conflicts with trademarks.
In the past, confusingly similar trademarks could exist simultaneously
in different geographical areas or in different business sectors without cre-
ating consumer confusion. The internet has drastically changed this situa-
tion because a domain name is both unique and global in scope.
Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LDTA, 273 F.3d 14, 19-20 (1st Cir. 2001) (citations
omitted). Anthony Malutta suggests another example: While United Airlines, United Ge-
netics, and United Way can all use the word "united" in their names, only one firm can
register and use the domain name www.united.com. See Anthony J. Malutta, International
Domain Name Disputes Don't Let Up: Notorious 'Typosquatter'John Zuccarini Has Been a Frequent
Defendant, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 22, 2003, at 58.
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level domain names, for example www.WhiteHouse.gov and www.
WhiteHouse.com.
47
While the Internet began as a United States Defense Department
project during the Cold War,48 today businesses, celebrities, politi-
cians, universities, governmental entities, and private citizens create
and maintain web sites to advertise, promote, educate, or disseminate
information. 49 The domain name is frequently the well-known name
of the organization or individual that owns the web site, such as www.
cocacola.com or www.cornell.edu.5 0° When an individual seeks a spe-
cific web site or a web site with specific content, she will type that web
site's domain name in the address bar of a web browser or, alterna-
tively, visit one of many search engine web sites. Search engines pro-
viding a listing of web sites that satisfy an individual's search criteria,
however, are not analogous to a phone book or directory assistance. 51
Hundreds of web sites may contain the keywords entered into the en-
gine, hence not all of the search results will be directly relevant.52
47 See Competition Specialties, Inc. v. Competition Specialties, Inc., Nos. 02-35831, 02-
35885, 2004 WL 94026, at *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 20, 2004) (two companies, one in Florida and
one in Washington, both conducted business under the name Competition Specialties,
Inc.); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 952 (C.D. Cal.
1997) (stating that "although two companies can have nonexclusive trademark rights in a
name, only one company can have a second-level domain name that corresponds to its
trademark"); ROWLAND & MACDONALD, supra note 18, at 520-21; see also Gregory B. Blas-
balg, Note, Masters of Their Domains: Trademark Holders Now Have New Ways to Control Their
Marks in Cyberspace, 5 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. Rv. 563, 586-87 (2000) (observing that while
trademark law permits multiple uses of the same mark for different goods and services,
only one entity can register and use the domain name on the Internet); Todd W. Krieger,
Note, Internet Domain Names and Trademarks: Strategies for Protecting Brand Names in Cyberspace,
32 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 47, 64 (noting that while there are 100,000 trademarks worldwide
that use the word "prince," only one can use the domain name www.prince.com).
48 See Matthew Edward Searing, Note, "What's in a Domain Name?" A Critical Analysis of
the National and International Impact on Domain Name Cybersquatting, 40 WASHBURN LJ. 110,
111-13 (2000).
49 See JAMES SLEVIN, THE INTERNET AND SOCIETY 40-44 (2000); UNDERSTANDING THE
WEB, supra note 10, at 66-69; Zuccarini Complaint, supra note 19, at I.
50 See Sallen, 273 F.3d at 19 (observing that "a person looking for the Coca-Cola Com-
pany's Web site might enter 'www.cocacola.com' into her Web browser, assuming (cor-
rectly) that it would turn up the Coca-Cola Company's official Web site").
51 See Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620 (PKL) (AJP), 1997 WL 97097, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997). The court observed that:
Internet domain names are similar to telephone number mnemonics, but
they are of greater importance, since there is no satisfactory Internet
equivalent to a telephone company white pages or directory assistance, and
domain names can often be guessed. A domain name mirroring a corpo-
rate name may be a valuable corporate asset, as it facilitates communication
with a customer base.
Id.
52 If Internet users are "forced to wade through hundreds of web sites" containing
inapposite results, the user may become frustrated and the rightful trademark holder may
suffer. Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1327 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Nis-
san Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 204 F.R.D. 460, 463 (C.D. Cal 2001) (noting the
plaintiff was able to contract with Internet search engine operators to divert traffic to his
1484 [Vol. 89:1476
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This situation increases the value of obtaining a domain name that
mirrors the business's name so that customers can quickly and effi-
ciently obtain information online. 53 Consequently, second level do-
main names are the source of most controversy because these popular
names serve as the most common means of identifying an entity's lo-
cation in cyberspace. 54
B. Reserving Your Space in Cyberspace: The Domain Name
Registration Process
Individuals who create web sites must register the desired domain
name with an Internet registrar, a private corporation that charges a
fee to reserve the domain name for a period of time, generally for one
or two years.55 Registering a domain name entitles the registrant to
use the domain name exclusively for the period of time purchased.
The registrar only determines if the requested unique name has been
previously assigned,5 6 and it does not require proof that the requested
domain name will not violate another individual's trademark. 5 7 If the
domain name is still available, the applicant is usually awarded the
web site rather than the defendant's web site); Teletech Customer Care Mgmt., Inc. v.
Tele-Tech Co. Inc., 977 F. Supp. 1407, 1410 (C.D. Cal 1997) (observing that search engines
can return hundreds of results that may "deter web browsers from searching from Plaintiffs
[sic] particular web site").
53 See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1327; see also 4 McCARTHY, supra note 41, § 25:73, at
25-178 (noting that "[a] battle over a domain name is essentially a battle for the same
'intuitive' domain name: a domain name that makes sense without looking it up"). Some
scholars argue for a non-zero-sum reservation system in which a web site with a popular
domain name would serve as a "link page" that would contain a small directory of all of the
web pages wishing to use the same domain name. SeeJennifer R. Dupre, A Solution to the
Problem? Trademark Infringement and Dilution by Domain Names: Bringing the Cyberworld in Line
with the "Real" World, 87 TRADEMARK REP. 613, 629-31 (1997). Additionally, some critics
argue that the number of disputes over domain name registration highlights the need for
new top-level domains. See ROWtAND & MACDONALD, supra note 18, at 532.
54 See King, supra note 15, at 458; see also 4 McCARTHY, supra note 41, § 25:72, at
25-173 (noting that "[i] n the same way that businesses sometimes desire to have a prestige
business address, businesses want a prestige address in cyberspace that corresponds to the
trade name of the company or to a company trademark").
55 Examples of Internet Registrars include Nominalia, Joker, Network Solutions, and
the Domain Name Registry of America.
56 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. See generally http://www.NetworkSolu
tions.com (last visited Apr. 6, 2004) (domain name registrar that does not require support-
ing documentation and does not cross-reference trademark holders).
57 See Storey v. Cello Holdings, L.L.C., 347 F.3d 370, 373 (2d Cir. 2003) (explaining
that the registration process operates "through a first-come, first-serve process that does
not consider trademark rights"); Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de
Barcelona, 330 F.3d 617, 624 (4th Cir. 2003) (same); Thomas v. Network Solutions, Inc.,
176 F.3d 500, 505 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (same). The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection
Act protects domain name registration companies from liability for registering infringing
domain names. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D) (2000).
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domain name.58 As of mid-2002, over thirty million domain names
had been registered worldwide, twenty-one million of which were in
the .com top level domain.59
In the early 1990s, the United States government granted Net-
work Solutions, Inc. (NSI), a private, for-profit corporation, the exclu-
sive right to register domain names on a first-come, first-served basis.60
NSI's administration created controversy by frequently suspending do-
main names without a hearing whenever trademark holders filed com-
plaints alleging trademark infringement. 61 As the Internet expanded
and the need for fair and efficient dispute resolution policies devel-
oped, the United States government completely converted domain
name registration and administration to a private, nonprofit, nongov-
ernmental system.62
In 1998, the United States Department of Commerce entered
into an agreement with a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization,
the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN), and charged the organization with managing the assign-
ment and distribution of domain names.63 ICANN oversees the whole
domain name system, but it licenses private companies, known as reg-
istrars, to assign IP addresses and register domain names. 64 Although
registrars do not independently determine whether a registrant has
the right to use a requested domain name, the ICANN terms of regis-
tration require that the registrant attest to certain facts. 65 As a condi-
tion of registering the requested name, the registrant must assert (1)
that his statements are true and he has the right to use the domain
name, (2) that using or registering the requested name does not in-
jure any third party's "trademark, servicemark, company name, or any
other intellectual property right" and (3) that the registrant is not
seeking the domain name for an illegal purpose, including unfair
competition. 66
Despite these registration requirements, individuals continue to
register deceptive domain names that violate existing trademarks and
58 See, e.g., Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 772 (6th Cir. 2003) (describing
how web designer registered the domain name "shopsatwillowbend.com" upon hearing
that a shopping mall named "The Shops at Willow Bend" was being built near his home
although he had no connection to the shopping mall and although the names "theshopsat
willowbend.com" and "shopwillowbend.com" were already registered).
59 See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 41, § 25:72, at 25-172.
60 Network Solutions was only charged with overseeing the registration of the generic
top level domains: .com, .net, and org. See King, supra note 15, at 460.
61 See id.
62 For further detail regarding the transition to the non-profit system, see id. at
459-67.
63 Id. at 467; Marsh, supra note 11, at 686.
64 Marsh, supra note 11, at 686.
65 Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1318-19 (9th Cir. 1998).
66 Id. at 1319.
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cause disputes. 67 When ICANN began overseeing the domain name
system, the federal government recognized past problems and re-
quired the implementation of a mechanism for resolving disputes.68
ICANN responded by adopting and implementing the Uniform Dis-
pute Resolution Policy (UDRP) .69 When an individual registers a do-
main name, he must agree to abide by the UDRP, which requires that
any dispute between the registrant and another party relating to the
registration or use of a domain name be subject to a mandatory ad-
ministrative proceeding. 70 This process is limited, however, because
the only remedies available are the cancellation of the domain name
and transfer of the name to the prevailing party. 71 Furthermore, al-
though challenges are usually successful, each case entails several
thousand dollars in filing fees and other costs. 72 Finally, while regis-
trants must agree to the administrative proceeding under the UDRP,
the agreement to arbitrate does not preclude claimants from filing a
civil suit in federal court.73
C. Typosquatting and Cybersquatting: Profit by Deception
Cybersquatting is the practice of preemptively registering popular
domain names-often the trademarks of third parties-in order to
rent or sell the domain name back to the owner of the trademark for a
value far exceeding the cost of the domain name.7 4 Cybersquatting
began during the 1990s when the Internet was becoming increasingly
commercialized, and it gained momentum when early exorbitant sales
encouraged the practice. 75 For example, the sale of the domain name
"business.com" reaped $7.5 million for a name that cost less than
thirty dollars to register initially.76 Celebrity singers Celine Dion and
Bruce Springsteen also became early victims of cybersquatting when a
67 See supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing NSI's ineffective handling of
trademark disputes).
68 See King, supra note 15, at 468.
69 See ICANN, UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY (1999) [hereinaf-
ter UDRP], at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2004).
70 See id. 1 1.
71 Id. 4(i); see Benjamin B. Cotton, Note, Prospecting or Cybersquatting: Registering Your
Name Before Someone Else Does, 35J. MARSHALL L. REv. 287, 293 (2002).
72 See Edelman, supra note 26.
73 See UDRP, supra note 69, 1 4(k), 5.
74 See H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 5-6 (1999); supranotes 14-18 and accompanying text.
75 SeeJonathan H. Anschell & John J. Lucas, What's in a Name: Dealing with Cybersquat-
ting, 21 ENT. & SPORTS L. 3, 3 (2003). Dennis Toeppen was one of the first cybersquatters
to face civil litigation for registering popular domain names such as Panavision, Delta Air-
lines, Neiman Marcus, Eddie Bauer, and more than 100 other business and celebrity
names. See id; see also Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1998)
(detailing Toeppen's cybersquatting conduct).
76 See Malutta, supra note 46; see also www.NetworkSolutions.com (last visited Apr. 6,
2004) (noting that the cost for a start-up kit is only $35).
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company named celebrityl000.com registered the domain names
"www.celinedion.com" and "www.brucespringsteen.com. ''77  Cyber-
squatters also approached Warner Brothers and offered to sell several
domain names, including bugsbunny.net and daffyduck.net, for over
$350,000.78
Cybersquatters also continually monitor the registries for recently
expired domain names.79 Once a registration period expires, a cyber-
squatter will snatch up the previously used domain name and try to
sell the name back to the legitimate owner, who has already been us-
ing the domain name for a number of years.8 0 Sometimes, the cyber-
squatter will even sell the domain name to the previous owner's
competitor.8 1
Typosquatting, like cybersquatting, involves registering domain
names in order to profit from the success and popularity of others. 82
While cybersquatting entails purchasing domain names and holding
them for ransom, typosquatting uses misspellings or variations of legit-
imate domain names in order to trick individuals into viewing unre-
lated advertisements or web sites.83 In one case involving the car
manufacturer Porsche Cars North America, a typosquatter registered
and attempted to sell the derivative domain name "porschesource.
com."84 The typosquatter registered several other derivatives of popu-
77 See Lemon, supra note 5, at 301-03.
78 Hearings, supra note 3, at 5 (statement of Anne H. Chasser, President, Int'l Trade-
mark Ass'n).
79 See Malutta, supra note 46. The merger of two companies also produces a golden
opportunity for cybersquatters. See Globalsantafe Corp. v. Globalsantafe.Com, 250 F. Supp.
2d 610, 613 (E.D. Va. 2003) (recounting how an individual registered the domain name
globalsantafe.com one day after the corporations Global Marine and Santa Fe publicly
announced an agreement to merge into an entity known as GlobalSantaFe Corporation);
Hearings, supra note 3, at 7 (prepared statement of Anne H. Chasser, President, Int'l Trade-
mark Ass'n) (noting that "when the merger between Mobil and Exxon was announced...
[the Mobil Oil Corporation] was contacted by a cybersquatter who offered to sell the com-
bined Exxon Mobil the domain names exxonmobil.com and exxon-mobil.com).
80 See Malutta, supra note 46.
81 Id.
82 See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text; see also United Parcel Serv. of Am.,
Inc. v. The Net, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 2d 274, 276 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (involving a typosquatter
who registered the domain name UPS.net, a derivative of United Parcel Service's UPS.com,
and programmed the web site to display banner advertisements and links to a porno-
graphic web site); Coca-Cola Co. v. Purdy, No. Civ. 02-1782 ADM/AJB, 2002 WL 1634277,
at *1 (D. Minn. July 23, 2002) (involving a typosquatter who registered several derivative
domain names including drinkcoke.org and mycocacola.com).
83 For example, "Mobil Corporation reported.., that their MOBIL 1 trademark was
used to direct people to a site containing adult material." Hearings, supra note 3, at 5
(statement of Anne H. Chasser, President, Int'l Trademark Ass'n).
84 Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Spencer, No. Civ. S-00-4716EB PAN, 2000 WL 641209,
at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 18, 2000). When Porsche visited www.porchesource.com, the web site
stated:
Domains for Sale!
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lar automobile manufacturers, such as "audisource.com," "nissan
source.com," and "acurasource.com. '"8
5
Once typosquatters secure similar domain names, they often pro-
gram the web sites with the deceptive names to direct viewers to differ-
ent web pages, many of which display pornographic content.8 6 Once
the user recognizes his mistake and tries to close the browser window,
the unwilling visitor will frequently find himself "mousetrapped" by a
series of pop-up advertisements cascading across the computer
screen. 87 The unwanted web site can also temporarily corrupt the
functions of the user's web browser by launching new undesired web
pages when the user clicks on the "back" button or attempts to close
the web browser altogether.88 In some cases, even if the user does
nothing at all, new web pages may open and create a "cyber-maze"
that bombards the user with unwelcome and frequently pornographic
images he did not intend to receive.89
Creating derivative web sites is, in itself, profitable because the
web sites generate Internet traffic and, therefore, advertising revenue
by preying on the popularity and goodwill of the primary web site. 90
Internet domain names are a precious resource. My company does
web page development and website hosting. Along the way, we reserved a
few domains for customers and for ourselves. Some of those domains are
in use and some are not (as of yet). But active or not, you can make us an
offer! Listed are the domains on which we currently would consider offers.
Please don't embarrass yourself by attempting to give us $500 for one of
these domains. They are valuable and have already turned away many buy-
ers that thought we weren't serious. If you are ready to make a smart invest-
ment, let us know .... You may be asking yourself, why so much?
... Can't Ijust reserve any domain and get my site online? Of course
you can. But which is more obvious to the public, shopping.com or ezinter
netshopping.com? (Good luck EZ Shop, you're going to need it!).
Id.
85 Id. (listing porschesource.com, lincolnsource.com, mercurysource.com, audi
source.com, gmcsource.com, nissansource.com, acurasource.com, pontiacsource.com, bu-
icksource.com, chryslersource.com, mazdasource.com, dodgesource.com).
86 Sealed Compl., United States v. Zuccarini, 4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2003) [hereinafter
Sealed Complaint]. In its investigation of John Zuccarini, the Federal Trade Commission
found that Internet users "were barraged with a series of advertisements-many of which
were for pornographic web sites-and found it difficult, and in some cases impossible, to
exit from these Web sites without shutting down their computer." Id.
87 See Shields v. Zuccarini, 89 F. Supp. 2d 634, 635 (E.D. Pa. 2000); Sealed Complaint,
supra note 86, at 4 n.2.
88 See Sealed Complaint, supra note 86, at 4 n.2. Adult web sites may also "employ tech-
nical devices, such asjavascripts, that disable the 'back' or 'close' buttons on a webbrowser
and prevent site visitors from leaving. To the extent that visitors arrive at these sites acci-
dentally, an audience that never intended to view pornography may find their computers
held hostage." Orr & Ferrigno-Stack, supra note 20, at 466-67. One web site encountered
during a Spring 2000 survey of pornographic websites "opened more than 30 browser win-
dows and disabled the workstation." Id. at 471.
89 Sealed Complaint, supra note 86, at 4 n.2.
90 Advertisers pay web site owners according to how many people visit the web site,
i.e., how many "hits" the web site receives. See Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 480 (3d
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Furthermore, programming the web sites to mousetrap users or to re-
direct unintentional visitors to additional web pages generates even
greater advertising revenue because every new window that pops up
counts as a separate "hit" for the web site. 91 The act of exploiting the
goodwill of other businesses through typosquatting is "a new form of
high-tech fraud" that causes "confusion and inconvenience for con-
sumers, increas[es] costs for people doing business on the Internet,
and pos[es] substantial threat to a century of pre-Internet American
business efforts." 92
In short, typosquatters and cybersquatters register popular or de-
ceptively similar domain names for several reasons. First, cybersquat-
ters may try to sell the derivative name to the trademark holder, and
many legitimate web site operators pay the ransom to avoid com-
plaints from users who may believe the principal owner is responsible
for the derivative web site.93 Second, typosquatters and cybersquatters
may cyber-speculate by registering popular domain names with the in-
tent of reselling them to any third party, usually through domain
name auction web sites.94  Third, typosquatters may use domain
names that are deceptively similar to legitimate web sites in order to
divert web traffic and generate advertising revenue. 95 Finally, typos-
quatters and cybersquatters may use deceptive domain names to trick
unwary consumers into providing sensitive information, such as their
Cir. 2001) ("Zuccarini received between ten and twenty-five cents from the advertisers for
every click.").
91 See id. The Department of Justice estimates that one notorious typosquatter, Zuc-
carini, earned between $800,000 and $1 million annually. Sealed Complaint, supra note 86,
at 6.
92 Hearings, supra note 3, at 1 (statement of Hon. Spencer Abraham, Member, S.
Comm. on the Judiciary). Senator Abraham also observed, "the cybersquatter can engage
in a variety of nefarious activities-from the relatively benign parody of a business or indi-
vidual, to the obscene prank of redirecting an unsuspecting consumer to pornographic
content, to the destructive worldwide slander of a centuries-old brand name." Id.; see also
Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Conn. 1996) (noting
that when "a company uses a domain which is identical to the name or trademark of
a[nother] company, an Internet user may inadvertently access an unintended company").
93 Hearings, supra note 3, at 2 (statement of Hon. Spencer Abraham, Member, S.
Comm. on the Judiciary) (noting that "[e]ven computer-savvy companies buy domain
names from cybersquatters at extortionate rates to rid themselves of a headache with no
certain outcome").
94 For example, the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA), owner of the web
site www.ucla.edu, took action against a cybersquatter who registered www.ucla.com and
created a pornographic web site. Hearings, supra note 3, at 8 (prepared statement of Anne
H. Chasser, President, Int'l Trademark Ass'n). In 1999, the domain names marypoppins.
com and thegodfather.com were available for $500 and $1,500, respectively, on an Internet
auction web site. Id. One domain name reseller, bestdomains.com, offered the domain
name "911porche.com" for $60,911. See id. at 11 (statement of Gregory D. Phillips,
Outside Counsel, Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc.).
95 See Shields, 254 F.3d at 479-80.
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credit card number or home address, to a web site that they believe
belongs to a reputable and trustworthy corporation.9 6
D. The Case of the Notorious Typosquatter
In 1997, cartoonist Joseph Shields registered the domain name
joecartoon.com to display his artwork and market Joe Cartoon mer-
chandise.9 7 The site gained popularity when it won the Macromedia
Shock site of the day award in April 1998, and the web site now aver-
ages over 700,000 visits per month.98 John Zuccarini registered five
variations on the domain name, each a misspelling, 99 and used the
deceptive domain names to feature advertisements for other web sites
and credit card companies.' 0 0 Fans of the Joe Cartoon characters who
unintentionally visited one of Zuccarini's sites found themselves
mousetrapped and unable to exit the maze of web sites and pop-up
advertisements. 0 1 Zuccarini received between ten and twenty-five
cents from advertisers for every hit, including both the initial acciden-
tal visit and all pop-up ads inadvertently launched by the uninten-
tional visitor.10 2
Shields responded by mailing cease and desist letters to Zuc-
carini, but received no response.' 0 3 Shortly thereafter, Zuccarini
changed the content of the deceptive web sites to a "political protest"
web page.' 0 4 Although Zuccarini eliminated the advertisements from
96 Hearings, supra note 3, at 4 (statement of Hon. Orr-in G. Hatch, Chairman, S.
Comm. on theJudiciary). In one case of commercial fraud, the telephone company AT&T
reported that a cybersquatter, wholly unaffiliated with the telephone conglomerate, regis-
tered the domain name attphonecard.com and solicited credit card information from web
site visitors. Id. at 5 (statement of Anne H. Chasser, President, Int'l Trademark Ass'n).
97 Shields, 254 F.3d at 479.
98 Id.
99 The five variations are: joescartoon.com, joecarton.com, joescartons.com, joescar
toons.com and cartoonjoe.com. Id. at 480.
100 Id.
101 Id.; see supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
102 Shields, 254 F.3d at 480.
103 Id.
104 Id. Zuccarini's web page stated:
This is a page of POLITICAL PROTEST
-Against the web site joecartoon.com-
joecartoon.com is a web site that depicts the mutilation and killing of ani-
mals in a shockwave based cartoon format-many children are inticed [sic]
to the web site, not knowing what is really there and then encouraged to
join in the mutilation and killing through use of the shockwave cartoon
presented to them.
-Against the domain name policys [sic] of ICANN-
-Against the Cyberpiracy Consumer Protection Act-
As the owner of this domain name, I am being sued byjoecartoon.com for
$100,000 so he can use this domain to direct more kids to a web site that
not only desensitizes children to killing animals, but makes it seem like
great fun and games.
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his site, Shields remained powerless to prevent confusion and to di-
rect potential viewers to the correct web page. 0 5
II
LIVING IN A TYPOSQUATrER'S PARADISE: LIMITED
DETERRENCE THROUGH FRAGMENTED LITIGATION
AND INEFFECTIVE ARBITRATION
As the previous Part illustrates, typosquatting affects both the le-
gitimate owners of popular and trademarked names and the Internet
users looking for legitimate information on the World Wide Web.
Until Congress passed the Truth in Domain Names Act, victims of cy-
bersquatting and typosquatting could only seek relief through trade-
mark law. 10 6 Trademark law is predicated on the "recognition that
companies and individuals build a property right in brand names be-
cause of the reasonable expectations they raise among consumers." 10 7
Owners of trademarked and popular names correctly argue that the
registration of domain names similar to their trademarked name di-
minishes the owners' ability to distinguish their legitimate goods and
services on the Internet.1 0 8
While legitimate owners could pursue civil suits under existing
trademark law, the costs of fragmented litigation against an infinite
number of defendants creates a substantial disincentive. Often, the
"sheer number of instances precludes many trademark owners from
filing multiple suits in one or more national courts."10 9 Therefore, in
many cases, trademark owners choose to pay off the cybersquatter to
I will under no circumstances hand this domain name over to him so he
can do that.
I hope that ICANN and Network Solutions will not assist him to attaining
this goal.
-Thank You-
Id.
105 See id.; Shields v. Zuccarini, 89 F. Supp. 2d 634, 635-36 & 635 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
106 See generally 4 McCARTHY, supra note 41, §§ 25:68-25:81 (discussing trademark law
issues in cyberspace).
107 Hearings, supra note 3, at 2 (statement of Hon. Spencer Abraham, Member, S.
Comm. on the Judiciary); see also Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002)
(noting that a
consumer who knows at a glance whose brand he is being asked to buy
knows whom to hold responsible if the brand disappoints and whose prod-
uct to buy in the future if the brand pleases. This in turn gives producers an
incentive to maintain high and uniform quality, since otherwise the invest-
ment in their trademark may be lost as customers turn away in disappoint-
ment from the brand
108 See, e.g., Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Taylor, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1005 (D. Minn.
1998) (reasoning that the "Post-It"® trademark was likely to be diluted by the use of and
traffic in the domain names post-it.com, post-its.com, and ipost-it.com).
109 Hearings, supra note 3, at 10 (statement of Gregory D. Phillips, Outside Counsel,
Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc.).
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avoid lengthy and costly litigation. 10 Finally, in addition to the al-
ready substantial cost of litigating a trademark claim, plaintiffs who
actually pursued legal remedies frequently found themselves con-
strained by antiquated trademark statutes ill-equipped to combat
cybersquatting.
A. The Mid-to-Late 1990s: The Federal Trademark Dilution Act
As the Internet morphed from an academic tool into a commer-
cial and educational resource, limited means of guarding against cy-
bersquatting and typosquatting existed."' Early cybersquatting cases
were couched in trademark law terms, and alleged violations of the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (FTDA) 112 and similar state
statutes.'13 A plaintiff must prove four elements to establish that the
defendant is violating the Federal Trademark Dilution Act: (1) that
the mark is famous, (2) that the defendant is using the mark in com-
merce, (3) that the defendant's use began after the mark became fa-
mous, and (4) that the defendant's use dilutes the mark's capacity to
identify and distinguish goods or services. 114
Winning domain name challenges under the FTDA was difficult
because a plaintiff had to prove that the defendant's use of the do-
main name was commercial in nature and that the defendant's use
had the effect of diluting the trademark. 15 In Panavision v. Toeppen,
the Ninth Circuit held that the FTDA applies to cybersquatting cases
because registering a mark in order to attempt to sell it constitutes a
commercial use, and using the mark of another company dilutes the
value of that company's mark.1 6 In that case, Panavision argued that
the defendant registered its trademarked name as an Internet domain
name, panavision.com, 1 7 and mailed a letter to Panavision expressing
1 10 See, e.g., id. at 8 (statement of Hon. Spencer Abraham, Member, S. Comm. on the
Judiciary) (stating that Gateway, Inc. paid $100,000 to a cybersquatter who placed porno-
graphic images at www.gateway20000.com, a misspelling of the company's www.gateway
2000.com web site).
Ill See Anschell & Lucas, supra note 75, at 3.
112 The FrDA provides: "The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled ... to an
injunction against another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade
name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution to the
distinctive quality of the mark'.. . ." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1) (2000); see also Panavision Int'l,
L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing the FIDA's requirement).
113 See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14330 (West 1987 & Supp. 2004) (prohibiting
the dilution of "the distinctive quality" of a mark).
114 Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1324.
115 See id.
116 !d. at 1327.
117 The defendant also registered approximately 240 other domain names such as
deltaairlines.com, eddiebauer.com, and neimanmarcus.com. See Hearings, supra note 3, at
7 (prepared statement of Anne H. Chasser, President, Int'l Trademark Ass'n).
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his desire "to settle the matter" for 130 times the initial cost of
registration." 18
The Ninth Circuit first concluded that the defendant made com-
mercial use of the domain name and that the defendant "act[ed] as a
'spoiler,' preventing Panavision and others from doing business on
the Internet under their trademarked names unless they pa[id] his
fee."1 1 9 While Toeppen's conduct satisfied the commercial use re-
quirement, the court also acknowledged that simply registering some-
one else's trademark as a domain name, without more, is not a
commercial use within the scope of the FTDA. 120 In this instance, the
defendant's conduct fell within the ambit of the statute because he
attempted to sell the trademarked domain name.1 2' Savvy cybersquat-
ters, however, could easily circumvent the Ninth Circuit's construction
of the commercial use requirement.122
The Ninth Circuit further concluded that Toeppen diluted
Panavision's trademark by registering panavision.com. 123 The FTDA
defines dilution as "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to
identify and distinguish goods or services," without regard to likeli-
hood of confusion or competition between the mark holder and the
defendant. 2 4 The dilution rendered Panavision less capable of distin-
guishing its goods and services on the Internet, and potential custom-
ers less capable of locating legitimate information on the Internet. a25
In addition to proving the elements of commercial use and dilu-
tion, a plaintiff must obtain personal jurisdiction 126 over a defendant
when proceeding under the FTDA-a difficult requirement in some
118 Toeppen offered to sell Panavision the domain name for $13,000, but only paid
$100 to register the domain name with Network Solutions, Inc. See Panavision, 141 F.3d at
1318-19.
119 Id. at 1325 (citing Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616, 621 (C.D.
Cal. 1996)); see also Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1239 (N.D. Ill. 1996)
(concluding in another FTDA case against the same defendant that the defendant's "inten-
tion to arbitrage the 'intermatic.com' domain name constitute[d] a commercial use").
120 Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1324.
121 Id. at 1325.
122 Anschell & Lucas, supra note 75, at 3 ("While redressing an early instance of cyber-
squatting, Panavision left open the possibility that a cybersquatter could register a famous
name as a domain name and then simply wait to be offered money to relinquish it.").
123 Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1327.
124 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). For an analysis of multipleinterpretations of the term
dilution, see Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 511-12 (7th Cir. 2002).
125 Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1326-27. Congress was concerned about the ability of the
Internet to dilute trademarks. Senator Patrick Leahy stated: "[I]t is my hope that this
antidilution statute can help stem the use of deceptive Internet addresses taken by those
who are choosing marks that are associated with the products and reputations of others."
141 CONG. REc. S19312 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
126 For thorough analyses of personal jurisdiction and the Internet, see Christopher
McWhinney et al., The "Sliding Scale" of PersonalJurisdiction Via the Internet, 2000 STAN. TECH.
L. REV. 1; Michele N. Breen, Comment, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: "Shoehorning"
Cyberspace into International Shoe, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 763, 776-813 (1998); Note, No
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Internet-related cases. 127 The Ninth Circuit considered three factors
in assessing whether Panavision could obtain specific personal juris-
diction over Toeppen, a non-resident defendant. 2 First, the court
considered whether the defendant purposefully availed himself of the
privileges of conducting business in the forum state, thereby invoking
the benefits and protections of the laws. 129 Second, the court consid-
ered whether Panavision's claim arose out of the defendant's activity
in the forum state.' 30 Third, the court assessed whether the exercise
of personal jurisdiction would be reasonable. 131 The court concluded
that Panavision satisfied all three personal jurisdiction requirements
because "Toeppen's acts were aimed at Panavision in California"'132
and because Toeppen's conduct "had the effect of injuring Panavision
in California where Panavision has its principle place of business and
where the movie and television industry is centered." 33
While Panavision held that the FTDA applied to cybersquatting,
the court's reasoning effectively precluded future courts from apply-
Bad Puns: A Different Approach to the Problem of Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet, 116 HARv.
L. REv. 1821 (2003).
127 See Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that
merely creating a web site does not justify an exercise of personal jurisdiction because it is
not the equivalent of purposefully establishing minimum contacts with the forum state).
But see CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1263 (6th Cir. 1996) (permitting per-
sonal jurisdiction over a defendant in Ohio where the defendant contracted to market a
product in other states through the Ohio-based CompuServe network); Alitalia-Linee
Aeree Italiane S.p.A. v. Casinoalitalia.com, 128 F. Supp. 2d 340, 347-51 (E.D. Va. 2001)
(upholding personal jurisdiction over a Dominican owner of a gambling web site where
five persons with billing addresses in the forum state accessed the web site); Maritz, Inc. v.
Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1332-34 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (exercising personal jurisdic-
tion in Missouri over a California web site operator that kept mailing lists of Internet users
for advertising, knew that its information would be transmitted globally, and had transmit-
ted information into Missouri approximately 131 times); Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set,
Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 164-65 (D. Conn. 1996) (concluding personal jurisdiction over
foreign corporation was justified where defendant created web site, conducted Internet
advertising activities directed toward all states, and the distance between Connecticut and
Massachusetts was minimal).
128 Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1320.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 1323. The court also noted that jurisdiction over Toeppen was particularly
reasonable because Toeppen sent a letter to Panavision in California, demanding money
for the domain name. Id. The letter stated:
If your attorney has advised you otherwise, he is trying to screw you. He
wants to blaze new trails in the legal frontier at your expense. Why do you
want to fund your attorney's purchase of a new boat (or whatever) when
you can facilitate the acquisition of 'PanaVision.com' cheaply and simply
instead?
Id. at 1319.
133 Id. at 1322 (applying the "effects test" for intentional action aimed at the state
under a tort analysis); Robert C. Scheinfeld & Parker H. Bagley, Long-Arm Jurisdiction; "Cy-
bersquatting," N.Y. L.J., Nov. 27, 1996, at 36.
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ing the FTDA to cybersquatting cases.13 4 Since the court mentioned
that merely registering a domain name does not satisfy the commer-
cial use element,135 cybersquatters could conceivably attempt to elude
the FTDA by waiting until trademark holders approached them in-
stead of aggressively trying to sell registered domain names. 136 Addi-
tionally, cybersquatters could arguably circumvent the personal
jurisdiction requirement of the FTDA by adopting the same passive
sales tactics. 137
B. 1999-2003: The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
The loopholes left by Panavision and its progeny bred proficient
cybersquatters capable of circumventing a statute that was not specifi-
cally tailored to prevent cybersquatting. 13 In 1999, Congress enacted
the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA)139 to create
a new cause of action against cybersquatters and thereby ameliorate "a
new form of piracy on the Internet caused by ... the deliberate, bad-
faith, and abusive registration of Internet domain names in violation
of the rights of trademark owners."' 40 Congress designed the ACPA
to augment-not to replace-traditional trademark suits available
under the Lanham Act141 and the Federal Trademark Dilution Act.' 42
134 See Anschell & Lucas, supra note 75, at 3.
135 Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1324; see, e.g., HQM, Ltd. v. Hatfield, 71 F. Supp. 2d 500, 507
(D. Md. 1999) (observing that "nearly every Court to have decided whether mere registra-
tion or activation of a domain name constitutes 'commercial use' has rejected such argu-
ments"); Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 307 (D.N.J. 1998) (stating that "the
mere registration of a domain name, without more, is not a 'commercial use' of a trade-
mark"); Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Scis. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 1276,
1279 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (noting that "[t]he mere registration of a domain name does not
constitute a commercial use");Juno Online Servs. v.Juno Lighting, Inc., 979 F. Supp. 684,
691-92 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (stating that "[t]he mere 'warehousing' of the domain name is not
enough to find that defendant placed the mark on goods or 'used or displayed [the mark]
in the sale or advertising of services'").
136 Anschell & Lucas, supra note 75, at 3.
137 Id.
138 See Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 238 F.3d 264, 267 (4th Cir. 2001)
(noting that Congress enacted the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act because
"then-current law did not expressly prohibit the act of cybersquatting and cybersquatters
had started to take the necessary precautions to insulate themselves from liability under
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act").
139 Pub. L. No. 106-113, §§ 3001-3010, 113 Stat. 1536, 1501(A)-545 (codified as
amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 note, 1114, 1116, 1117, 1125, 1129; 16 U.S.C. § 470a; 28
U.S.C. § 1338; 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000)).
140 S. REP No. 106-140, at 4 (1999); see also Hearings, supra note 3, at 2 (statement of
Hon. Spencer Abraham, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (noting the need for "legis-
lation which addresses the issue of in rem jurisdiction" that combats cybersquatting attacks
by "supplementing existing rights under trademark law").
141 Trademark Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15, 17, and 28 U.S.C.).
142 See Allon Lifshitz, Recent Developments, Cybersquatting, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGiS. 529,
537 (2001).
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While the ACPA specifically targets bad faith attempts to profit from
deceptive domain names, a limitation of the ACPA is that it only pro-
tects domain names associated with trademarks.1 43 The ACPA does,
however, protect individuals who register their personal names or
nicknames as domain names.' 44
Congress drafted the ACPA to target individuals who register do-
main names solely to "profit by extortion."'145 The ACPA creates a
civil cause of action where a person "registers, traffics in, or uses a
domain name"1 46 in bad faith, intending to profit from another per-
son's famous or distinctive mark.147 To establish infringement of a
distinctive mark, the owner of the mark must prove that the allegedly
infringing domain name is "identical or confusingly similar" to the
distinctive mark as of the time of the domain name's registration. 148
143 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (1) (A) (i) (2000).
144 See Schmidheiny v. Weber, 146 F. Supp. 2d 701, 705 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (stating that
"[the] ACPA... reaches any name of 'another living person,' irrespective of whether that
name has become a protectable mark").
145 See Ford Motor Co. v. Greatdomains.com, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 635, 642 (E.D.
Mich. 2001).
146 The term "traffics in" is defined broadly as "transactions that include, but are not
limited to, sales, purchases, loans, pledges, licenses, exchanges of currency, and any other
transfer for consideration or receipt in exchange for consideration." 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(d)(1)(E) (2000); see aLsoFord Motor Co., v. Catalanotte, 342 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir.
2003) (
When the defendant registered the domain name FORDWORLD.COM and
later offered it for sale to Ford, he trafficked in the domain name for the
purposes of the ACPA. Registering a famous trademark as a domain name
and then offering it for sale to the trademark owner is exactly the wrong
Congress intended to remedy when it passed the ACPA.
147 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (1) (A) (2000); Domain Name Clearing Co. v. F.C.F., Inc.,
No. 00-2509, 2001 WL 788975 (4th Cir.July 12, 2001); People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals, Inc. v. Doughney, 113 F. Supp. 2d 915, 920 (E.D. Va. 2000). The Act also applies
to domain names that are "a trademark, word, or name protected by reason of section 706
of title 18 or section 220506 of title 36." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (1) (A) (ii) (i11) (2000).
148 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(I) (2000). Section 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IX) refers to
§ 1125(c)(1) when determining whether a mark is distinctive or famous. That section
provides:
In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may con-
sider factors such as, but not limited to-
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the
goods or services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is
used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the
mark is used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and
channels of trade used by the marks' owner and the person against
whom the injunction is sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third
parties; and
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Similarly, to establish infringement of a famous mark, the owner of
the mark must establish that the allegedly infringing domain name is
"identical or confusingly similar to or dilutive of' a mark that is fa-
mous at the time of the domain name's registration. 149 Once the
owner of a famous or distinctive mark establishes infringement, a
court may "order the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name
or the transfer of the domain name to the owner of the mark.' 150
The ACPA also requires bad-faith intent to maintain a cause of
action. Consequently, the Act exempts persons who have legitimate
interests in domain names that may be identical to a famous or dis-
tinctive mark-even where there is some incidental benefit because
the name is distinctive or famous.1 51 The Act enumerates a non-ex-
haustive, illustrative list of factors that a court may consider in deter-
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881,
or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
Id. § 1125(c)(1).
149 Id. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(II).
150 Id. § 1125(d)(1)(C); see America Online, Inc. v. AOL.org, 259 F. Supp. 2d 449,
453-57 (E.D. Va. 2003).
151 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i); Competition Specialties, Inc. v. Competition Spe-
cialties, Inc., Nos. 02-35831, 02-35885, D.C. No. CV-00-00038-RSL, 2004 "AIL 94026 (9th Cir.
Jan. 20, 2004) (affirming lower court determination that the plaintiffs ACPA claim for
damages failed because it could not prove bad-faith intent); Ford Motor Co. v. Greatdo
mains.com, Inc, 177 F. Supp. 2d 635, 642 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (reasoning that the bad faith
factors enumerated in the ACPA focus on whether the defendant's use of the domain
name is not solely to profit from the value of the trademark). The Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee also noted that bad faith is a requisite for civil liability:
Civil liability would attach only if a person had no intellectual property
rights in the domain name identifier; the domain name identifier was not
the person's legal first name or surname; and the person registered, ac-
quired, or used the domain name identified with the bad-faith intent to
benefit from the goodwill of another's trademark or service mark.
Hearings, supra note 3, at 2 (statement of Hon. Spencer Abraham, Member, S. Comm. on
the Judiciary). Some scholars, however, still argue that the ACPA provides too much
power to large corporations who may become the aggressors against individuals holding
legitimate domain names. See Debra Baker, Standing Up To Cybersquatters: Judges Are Seizing
On New Legislation to Keep Web Site Pirates from Taking a Name for Themselves, 86 A.B.A. J. 18,
20 (March 2000). In one recent case, a Canadian teenager, Mike Rowe, registered the
domain name MikeRoweSoft.com. Boy Swaps MikeRoweSoft for Xbox, BBC NEWS, Jan. 26,
2004, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/3429485.stm (last visited Apr. 16, 2004).
When Rowe rejected a ten-dollar offer to purchase the domain name, attorneys for the
software conglomerate Microsoft, Inc. responded with a letter asking the teen to give up
the domain name. Daniel Sieberg, Teen Fights to Keep MikeRoweSoft.com, CNN.coM, Jan. 20,
2004, at http://www.cnn.com/2004/TECH/internet/O1/20/rowe.fight/index.html (last
visited Apr. 16, 2004). Rowe commented: "I don't think Microsoft's really to blame for this
... I really think it's a lawyer thing with them trying to get more money." Id. Rowe
ultimately agreed to transfer the domain name to Microsoft, and in exchange Microsoft
paid for computer programming classes, invited Rowe to its headquarters for a conference,
and mailed a free Xbox video game system. Boy Swaps MikeRoweSofi for Xbox, supra. After
settling the dispute, a spokesperson for Microsoft conceded, "We take our trademark seri-
ously, but in this case maybe a little too seriously." Sieberg, supra.
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mining whether a person satisfies the bad-faith intent requirement. 152
Among other statutory factors, a court can consider as indicative of
bad faith the defendant's offer to sell the domain name, the intent to
divert traffic from the plaintiffs legitimate web site, and a pattern of
registering famous trademarks as domain names.153 A court may also
consider additional factors not specifically included in the Act. t 54 Fi-
nally, a plaintiff cannot prove bad-faith intent if the court "determines
that the person believed and had reasonable grounds to believe that
the use of the domain name was a fair use or otherwise lawful."'' 55
The ACPA addressed the two primary defects of prosecuting cy-
bersquatting suits under the FTDA: the commercial use and personal
jurisdiction requirements. 156 Unlike the FTDA, the ACPA does not
require commercial use of the infringing domain name. 57 To rem-
edy the jurisdictional difficulties plaintiffs faced under the FTDA, the
ACPA permits the exercise of in rem jurisdiction against the domain
name itself.158 Under the in rem provision, a plaintiff can file an
ACPA suit in the judicial district in which the domain name registrar
is located if the plaintiff cannot obtain in personam jurisdiction or if
the plaintiff attempts and fails to locate a person to defend the civil
suit. 159
Courts have also applied the ACPA to typosquatting, noting that
the statute protects against identical or "confusingly similar" domain
152 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (1) (B) (i) (2000); see also Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Do-
main Names, 302 F.3d 214, 234 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting that no simple formula exists for
evaluating and weighing the bad faith factors); People for the Ethical Treatment of Ani-
mals, Inc. v. Doughney, 113 F. Supp. 2d 915, 920-21 (E.D. Va. 2000) (applying the statu-
tory factors and concluding that the defendant had the requisite bad-faith intent). For
detailed analyses of the bad faith factors, see 4 McCARTHY, supra note 41, § 25:78, at 25-
270-25-290; Searing, supra note 48, at 119-31.
153 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i); Anschell & Lucas, supra note 75, at 3.
154 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i).
155 Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii).
156 See supra Part II.A.
157 See Anschell & Lucas, supra note 75, at 3.
158 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2) (A); Hearings, supra note 3, at 3 (statement of Hon. Spencer
Abraham, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (observing that "[u] nder this legislation,
the owner of a mark could bring an in rem action against the domain name identifier
itself"); see also Cable News Network, L.P. v. Cnnews.com, 56 Fed.Appx. 599, 603, No. 02-
1112, 2003 WrL 152846 (4th Cir. Jan. 23, 2003) (exercising in rem jurisdiction over domain
name); Mattel, Inc. v. Barbie-Club.com, 310 F.3d 293, 308 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding in rem
jurisdiction requirements not satisfied); Caesars World, Inc., v. Caesars-Palace.com, 112 F.
Supp. 2d 502, 505 (E.D. Va. 2000) (exercising in rem jurisdiction and upholding as consti-
tutional the ACPA's jurisdiction statute); Lucent Techs., Inc., v. Lucentsucks.com, 95 F.
Supp. 2d 528, 533-34 (E.D. Va. 2000) (concluding plaintiff's eight-day notice for in rem
proceeding gave defendant insufficient notice and did not satisfy statute's due diligence
requirement that a plaintiff first attempt to secure personal jurisdiction).
159 15 U.S.C. §1125(d)(2)(A)(ii) (2000); see Shri Ram Chandra Mission v.
Sahajmarg.org, 139 F. Supp. 2d 721, 723 (E.D. Va. 2001) (applying the provision); Anschell
& Lucas, supra note 75, at 4.
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names. 160 Although courts have broadly applied the ACPA to cases
involving deliberate typosquatting,' 6 ' such as the Zuccarini case, 162
the Act's reach is limited in other instances. 163 For example, in Ty Inc.
v. Perryman,164 the Seventh Circuit concluded that a reseller of Ty's
popular Beanie Babies product did not violate the ACPA by register-
ing the domain name www.bargainbeanies.com. 16 5 In an opinion by
Judge Posner, the court reasoned that the term "Beanie Baby" was a
"basic element of the product" rather than the manufacturer or
brand.' 66 Thus, Ty was not entitled to absolute protection without
showing "that the consuming public accepts [Beanie Babies] as the
designation of a brand of the product."'1 67 Consequently, while courts
may apply the ACPA to cases in which deliberate misspellings were a
part of a typosquatting scheme, 68 some courts may also allow popular
names to be included as part of a domain name when the web sites
advertise related products. 69
Although Congress drafted the ACPA to remove the obstacles
plaintiffs encountered when pursuing cases under the FTDA, the leg-
islation possesses its own set of problems. Two aspects of the law sub-
stantially limit its effectiveness in cybersquatting and typosquatting
cases. First, under the Act, a successful claimant can only obtain in-
junctive relief or statutory damages.1 7 0 While a court can impose civil
damages ranging from $1,000 to $100,000 per domain name, deriva-
tive web sites generate substantial advertising revenue, which may out-
weigh the penalties accumulated in suits that are actually filed and
160 E. &J. Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs Ltd., 286 F.3d 270, 274 (5th Cir. 2002); Shields
v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 483-84 (3d Cir. 2001); Victoria's Secret Stores v. Artco Equip.
Co., 194 F. Supp. 2d 704, 737-38 (S.D. Ohio 2002); Victoria's Cyber Secret Ltd. P'ship v. V
Secret Catalogue, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1351 (S.D. Fla. 2001);Jack in the Box, Inc. v.
Jackinthebox.org, 143 F. Supp. 2d 590, 592 (E.D. Va. 2001); Zipee Corp. v. U.S. Postal
Serv., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1087 (D. Or. 2000); see also Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v.
Tchou, 304 F.3d 936, 947 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding ACPA claim was not justified because
domain name registrar did not act in bad faith).
161 In U.S. Olympic Committee v. 20000ympic.com, a federal district court judge ordered
the largest transfer award ever-818 domain names-to the U.S. Olympic Committee, In-
ternational Olympic Committee, and other committees charged with organizing the
Olympic games. See U.S. Olympic Comm. v. 20000lympic.com, No. 00-1018-A (E.D. Va.
Apr. 4, 2003).
162 See supra Part I.D; infra Part II.D.
163 Anschell & Lucas, supra note 75, at 4.
164 306 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2002).
165 Id. at 510, 514-15.
166 Id. at 513-14.
167 Id. at 514; see also id. at 513 ("Ty's trademarks likewise are descriptive of the product
they denote; its argument that 'Beanies' is 'inherently distinctive' (like Kodak and Exxon),
and therefore protected by trademark law without proof of secondary meaning, is
nonsense.").
168 See Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 484 (3d Cir. 2001).
169 See Ty Inc., 306 F.3d at 513-14; Anschell & Lucas, supra note 75, at 4.
170 15 U.S.C. §§ 1117(d), 1129(2) (2000).
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successfully litigated.1 71 In this sense, the ACPA may make cybersquat-
ting and typosquatting less profitable, but it does not completely erad-
icate the incentive to cyber- or typosquat.
Second, the Act fails to address the transaction costs associated
with prosecuting the potentially infinite number of civil lawsuits neces-
sary to protect a domain name. Because the domain name registra-
tion system does not independently verify a registrant's right to use a
requested domain name, 172 cybersquatters can register hundreds or
thousands of domain names with little difficulty. More significantly,
many different cybersquatters could register one derivative domain
name each, thus requiring a single plaintiff to file hundreds of indi-
vidual lawsuits to protect one domain name. 7 3
C. ICANN and Arbitration Under the Uniform Domain Name
Resolution Policy
In addition to pursuing civil suits, individuals can attempt to re-
cover domain names through ICANN's mandatory arbitration pro-
ceedings. 174 Arbitration is an attractive means of prosecuting a
cybersquatting case because it provides a binding resolution less ex-
pensively and more expeditiously than federal civil litigation.
175
Moreover, arbitration avoids jurisdictional problems because regis-
trants automatically subject themselves to ICANN regulations as a con-
dition of domain name registration. 176 Nor is arbitration an exclusive
remedy; either party may pursue other legal remedies at any time.177
If ICANN has already concluded its administrative proceeding and
one party documents that it has filed a lawsuit, the ICANN Administra-
171 Compare Zuccarini Plea, supra note 1, at I (stating that John Zuccarini earned ap-
proximately $1 million per year from cybersquatting activity), with 15 U.S.C. § 1117(d)
(providing for civil damages ranging from $1,000 to $100,000 per domain name).
172 See supra Part I.B.
173 This assumes, of course, that a plaintiff can identify and locate the defendant. See,
e.g., Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 576 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (detailing
how one domain name owner used aliases and provided fictitious names and addresses).
174 Arbitration costs under the UDRP vary depending on the dispute resolution organ-
ization selected, with fees ranging from $750 for a single-arbitrator panel to as much as
$4,500 for a three-arbitrator panel. See Diane L. Kilpatrick, Comment, ICANNDispute Reso-
lution vs. Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act Remedies: Which Makes More "Cents"for the
Client , 2 Hous. Bus. & TAX L.J. 283, 295 (2002). Parties must also pay attorneys' fees in
addition to arbitration forum costs. For a step-by-step guide to prosecuting a cybersquat-
ting case before WIPO, see Anschell & Lucas, supra note 75, at 6-7.
175 See Anschell & Lucas, supra note 75, at 5; Searing, supra note 48, at 134 (noting that
the time for discovery and motions is reduced and a decision is usually entered within sixty
days of filing).
176 See Parisi v. Netlearning, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 745, 747 (E.D. Va. 2001) (noting that
the UDRP binds registrants through their contracts with registrars); Searing, supra note 48,
at 134-35.
177 See King, supra note 15, at 475.
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tive Panel will not implement its decision until the lawsuit is settled or
withdrawn. 178
ICANN promulgated a Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolu-
tion Policy (UDRP) t 79 that approved dispute resolution service prov-
iders enforce1 s° Every approved service provider must subscribe to
the UDRP, and registrants must submit to mandatory arbitration
under the UDRP in cybersquatting and typosquatting cases. 18
ICANN's policy applies, however, only to those cases in which some-
one registers a domain name in bad faith, with the intent to profit
178 See Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, 330 F.3d 617,
624 (4th Cir. 2003); BroadBridge Media, L.L.C. v. Hypercd.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 505, 509
(S.D.N.Y. 2000); UDRP, supra note 69, 4(k).
179 For a critical analysis of the procedural and substantive limitations of current
UDRP application, see Robert A. Badgley, Improving ICANN in Ten Easy Steps: Ten Sugges-
tionsfor ICANN to Improve its Anti-Cybersquatting Arbitration System, 2001 U. ILL. J. L. TECH. &
POL'Y 109, 113-28.
180 ICANN provides a listing of approved dispute resolution centers. ICANN, Approved
Providers for Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, at http://icann.org/dndr/udrp/
approved-providers.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2004). In selecting dispute resolution service
providers, ICANN looks for organizations with a history of "competently handling the cleri-
cal aspects of ADR proceedings," that employ "highly qualified neutrals who have agreed to
serve as panelists." See ICANN, Infmrmation Concerning Approval Process for Dispute-Resolution
Service Providers, at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/provider-approval-process.htm (last
visited Apr. 16, 2004).
181 The UDRP provides, in relevant part:
You are required to submit to a mandatory administrative proceeding in
the event that a third party (a "complainant") asserts to the applicable Pro-
vider, in compliance with the Rules of Procedure, that
(i) your domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trade-
mark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and
(ii) you have no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain
name; and
(iii) your domain name has been registered and is being used in bad
faith.
UDRP, supra note 69, 1 4(a). Further, the policy enumerates specific circumstances that
constitute bad-faith use:
(i) circumstances indicating that you have registered or you have acquired
the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise
transferring the domain name registration to the complainant who is the
owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that com-
plainant, for valuable consideration in excess of your documented out-of-
pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or
(ii) you have registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of
the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding
domain name, provided that you have engaged in a pattern of such con-
duct; or
(iii) you have registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of
disrupting the business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, you have intentionally attempted to attract,
for commercial gain, Internet users to your web site or other on-line loca-
tion, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant's mark as
to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of your web site or
location or of a product or service on your web site or location.
Id. 4(b).
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commercially from another's trademark, thereby "relegat[ing] all 'le-
gitimate' disputes-such as those where both disputants had long-
standing trademark rights in the name ... to the courts.'
182
Section 4(b) (i) of the UDRP outlines the requirement for bad-
faith intent, and, in doing so, appears to describe the typical cyber-
squatting or typosquatting case. As an example of bad-faith domain
name use, the section describes registering or acquiring a domain
name "primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise trans-
ferring" the domain name to a third party complainant "or to a com-
petitor" for any payment higher than the "out-of-pocket costs directly
related to the domain name.' 8 3 Even though the UDRP encom-
passes typosquatting and arbitration cases are usually successful,
ICANN is only empowered to cancel or transfer the infringing domain
name.' 8 4 Monetary damages are not available. 185
D. The Return of the Notorious Typosquatter
In response to John Zuccarini's registration of domain names
mimicking the popular web site JoeCartoon.com, Joseph Shields filed
suit in federal district court arguing that Zuccarini violated state and
federal unfair competition laws, as well as the Anticybersquatting Con-
sumer Protection Act.'8 6 The district court permanently enjoined
Zuccarini from using any domain name similar to joecartoon.com,
and awarded Shields $50,000 in statutory damages and nearly $40,000
in fees and court costs.' 8 7 After months of litigation and an appeal to
the Third Circuit, Shields ultimately prevailed and retained the judg-
182 ICANN, Second Staff Report on Implementation Documents for the Uniform Dispute Resolu-
tion Policy, 4.1 (c) (Oct. 24, 1999), at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-second-staff-re
port-24oct99.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2004). Additional documents regarding the devel-
opment of the UDRP are available at http://www.icann.org/udrp/historical.html (last vis-
ited Apr. 16, 2004).
183 UDRP, supra note 69, 4(b) (i).
184 UDRP, supra note 69, 4(i). As of July 16, 2002, arbitration panels decided ap-
proximately 5,240 disputes, of which the complaining party prevailed in 4,194 cases. See4
MCCARTHY, supra note 41, § 25:74.2, at 25-205 n.4.1 (2003). As of April 16, 2004, arbitra-
tion panels under the UDRP decided a total of 7,759 cases involving 13,269 domain names,
and 608 cases were pending, involving 900 domain names. ICANN, Statitstical Summary of
Proceedings Under Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (Feb. 25, 2004), at http://
www.icann.org/udrp/proceedings-stat.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2004). The first case pros-
ecuted under ICANN's mandatory arbitration resulted in the transfer of the infringing
domain name to the trademark holder. See World Wrestling Fed'n Entm't, Inc. v. Bosman,
WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, No. D99-0001 (Jan. 14, 2000) (involving a cyber-
squatter who attempted to sell the domain name www.worldwrestlingfederation.com to
WNWF Entertainment, Inc. three days after registering the domain name), at http://arbiter.
wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/1999/d1999-0001.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2004).
185 See UDRP, supra note 69, 4(i).
186 Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 479-80 (3d Cir. 2001); see supra Part I.D.
187 See Shields, 254 F.3d at 481. For a detailed analysis of the district court and Third
Circuit opinions, see Marsh, supra note 11, at 691-711.
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ment of nearly $100,000, as well as the permanent injunction protect-
ing the joecartoon.com web site against Zuccarini in the future.,88
But this litigation concerned only five web sites and one individ-
ual wronged by Zuccarini.189 Zuccarini still owns nearly 9,000 mis-
spelled domain names.190 At least ninety percent of Zuccarini's
domain names redirect the user to a single sexually explicit site, which
subsequently mousetraps the unsuspecting user in a maze of porno-
graphic images.1 91 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has re-
ceived numerous complaints from consumers who inadvertently
accessed web sites controlled by Zuccarini because they misspelled a
domain name. 9 2 Recently, the FTC initiated a civil action resulting in
an order permanently enjoining Zuccarini from registering misspell-
ings of common Internet domain names.193 ICANN arbitration has
also failed to deter Zuccarini. 194 Panels of UDRP arbitrators ruled
against Zuccarini in 98 of approximately 100 proceedings and or-
dered him to transfer the domain names to the legitimate domain
name holders. 195 Despite these numerous rulings by federal courts
and ICANN arbitration panels, Zuccarini continues to register mis-
leading domain names. 196
The Zuccarini case underscores the limitations of existing legisla-
tion and mandatory arbitration proceedings-despite the fact that
these statutes and policies were specifically designed to combat cyber-
squatting and typosquatting.' 97 While the ACPA solved the jurisdic-
tional and commercial use requirements that plagued plaintiffs under
the FTDA, the statute did not-and could not-reduce the high trans-
action costs associated with prosecuting multiple cybersquatting cases
against numerous defendants. 98 While ICANN mandatory arbitra-
tion provides a forum for resolving domain name disputes free from
jurisdictional concerns, the only remedy available to prevailing plain-
tiffs is the transfer of the infringing domain name. 199 In short, absent
more aggressive intervention, typosquatting will continue because of
the high transaction costs associated with fragmented litigation, the
188 Shields, 254 F.3d at 488.
189 Id. at 479-80; see, e.g., Electronics Boutique Holdings Corp. v. Zuccarini, No. 01-
1476, 2002 WL 917789 (3d Cir. Apr. 25, 2002); Electronics Boutique Holdings Corp., v.
Zuccarini, No. Civ. A. 00-4055, 2000 NAL 1622760 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2000).
190 Edelman, supra note 26.
191 Id.
192 See Sealed Complaint, supra note 86, at 5-6.
193 See FrC v. Zuccarini, No. Civ. A. 01-CV4854, 2002 WL 1378421 (E.D. Pa. 2002);
Sealed Complaint, supra note 86, at 11.
194 See Sealed Complaint, supra note 86, at 6-8.
195 Id. at 6.
196 Id. at 12.
197 See supra Part II.B-C.
198 See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
199 UDRP, supra note 69, 4(1).
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insignificance of injunctions issued against one typosquatter when
many others loom on the horizon, and the limited financial penalties
that are relatively insignificant compared to the substantial advertising
revenue generated by typosquatting.
III
THE TRUTH IN DOMAIN NAMES ACT OF 2003:
A PREVENTATIVE MEASURE TO
DETER TYPOSQUATTING
In 2003, Congress enacted the Truth in Domain Names Act 20 0 as
one component of the comprehensive Prosecutorial Remedies and
Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today (PROTECT)
Act, 20 a 47-page bill designed to "restore the government's ability to
prosecute child pornography offenses successfully."20 2 The PRO-
TECT Act, which encompassed a variety of child-protection legislative
initiatives, passed through Congress in response to the highly publi-
cized Elizabeth Smart abduction. 20 3 In addition to enhancing child
pornography penalties, the legislation nationalized both the AMBER
Alert system,20 4 a means of rapidly disseminating information in child
kidnapping cases, and the Code Adam system, a program imple-
mented by retail stores to locate missing children. 20 5 The PROTECT
Act met substantial public approval, and was fast-tracked to pass both
Houses of Congress during National Crime Victims' Rights Week.206
200 Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 521, 117 Stat. 686 (2003) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2252B
(Supp. 1 2003)).
201 Pub. L. No. 108-21, 17 Stat. 650-95 (2003) (codified in scattered sections of 18, 28
and 42 U.S.C.).
202 S. REP. No. 108-2, at 1 (2003). During Senate debates regarding the PROTECT
Act, Senator Hatch stated:
I also want to highlight other important measures contained in the confer-
ence report that will enhance existing laws, investigative tools, criminal pen-
alties, and child crime resources in a variety of ways .... [I]n addition to
the PROTECT Act, AMBER Act, and the Code Adam Act, the legislation
would . . . increase penalties and provide prosecutors with enhanced tools
to prosecute those who lure children to porn Web sites using misleading
domain names.
149 CONG. REc. S5114 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
203 See Christopher Smith, AMBER Alert Turns into Political Football in D.C.; Ed Smart Says
Each Day Without Law 'Costs a Life', THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Mar. 14, 2003, at A14, available
at http://global.factiva.com/en/arch/print-results.asp.
204 See 149 CONG. REc. S5114 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of Sen. Hatch)
("The legislation also addresses AMBER alert, America's Missing Broadcast Emergency Re-
sponse. The bill will extend the AMBER alert system across our Nation.").
205 Id. (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("The legislation includes the Code Adam Act, which
would require Federal buildings to establish procedures for locating a child that is missing
in the building.").
206 See, e.g., id. (discussing issued statement of John Walsh); 149 CONG. REC. H3071
(daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of Rep. Pence) ("I would particularly like to single out
the courageous and tenacious and dogged efforts of the chairman of the Committee on
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In this sense, the Truth in Domain Names Act became law as part of
an effort to protect children on the Internet, rather than to protect
trademarks. 2 07
The first subsection of the Truth in Domain Names Act criminal-
izes the knowing use of "a misleading domain name on the Internet
with the intent to deceive a person into viewing material constituting
obscenity." 20 8 This subsection does not, however, require that the
misleading domain name affect minors in any way. 209 The second
subsection of the statute criminalizes the knowing use of "a misleading
domain name on the Internet with the intent to deceive a minor into
viewing material that is harmful to minors." 21 0 A conviction under the
first subsection for using a misleading domain name as a route to ob-
scene materials could result in a fine of up to $250,000 and two years
in prison. 2 11 If the conviction is for an offense involving minor vic-
tims, however, the potential prison term doubles to four years.21 2 The
statute excludes from its operation domain names that include terms
which indicate the sexual content of the site, such as "sex" or
"porn."2 1 3
the Judiciary, the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. SENSENBRENNER), for the gentleman's
commitment against, at times, withering public relations challenges to move meaningful
legislation for our kids through this body.").
207 See 149 CONG. Rrc. H3059 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of Rep. Myrick)
(praising the legislation for easing the ability to prosecute
those who use misleading domain names to attract children to sexually ex-
plicit Internet sites. It accomplishes this goal by increasing the penalties
and provides prosecutors with enhanced tools to prosecute those seeking to
lure children to porn Web sites. As a mother and grandmother, it is hard
for me to understand how anyone can prey on a defenseless child.
Therefore, I urge my colleagues to support the rule and support the
underlying bill. It is imperative for our Nation to protect our most valuable
resource, our children.
208 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252B(a) (Supp. 1 2003).
209 See id.
210 Id. § 2252B(b). The statute defines "material that is harmful to minors" as
[A] ny communication, consisting of nudity, sex, or excretion, that, taken as
a whole and with reference to its context-
(1) predominantly appeals to a prurient interest of minors;
(2) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult commu-
nity as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors; and
(3) lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for
minors.
Id. § 2252B(d). For the purposes of subsection (d), the term "sex" is defined broadly to
include "acts of masturbation, sexual intercourse, or physcial [sic] contact with a person's
genitals, or the condition of human male or female genitals when in a state of sexual
stimulation or arousal." Id. § 2252B(e) (footnote omitted).
211 Id. § 2252B(a); see Zuccarini Plea, supra note 1, at 5.
212 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252B(b) (Supp. 1 2003).
213 Id. § 2252B(c). Subsection (c) provides that "[f]or the purposes of this section, a
domain name that includes a word or words to indicate the sexual content of the site, such
as 'sex' or 'porn,' is not misleading." Id.
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A. The Political Climate in Which Congress Passed the
PROTECT Act
While Congress legislated under the guise of protecting children
and nationalizing the AMBER Alert program, several extraneous
amendments were appended to the PROTECT Act, including the
Truth in Domain Names Act and sentencing guidelines revisions
prohibiting downward departures in child molestation cases. 214 The
limited legislative history available on the Truth in Domain Names
Act-less than one page in a seventy-page House Conference Re-
port-only hints at the controversy caused by the Act and other provi-
sions tacked onto the PROTECT Act.2 1 5 The final House Conference
Report justifies the Act as "constitutional and necessary" because of
the "growing trend for those attempting to sell pornography to use
aggressive and misleading tactics to deceive unsuspecting and unwill-
ing individuals, both adults and minors, into viewing the pornogra-
214 See, e.g., id. at 3074 (statement of Rep. Honda)
[lit is with a troubled heart that I will be voting for the PROTECT Act
today. The benefits of a national AMBER Alert network are undeniable,
and I cannot support any further delay on its implementation. However, I
do not believe that this Conference Report will make good law, and I fer-
vently hope that Congress will soon repeal the egregious provisions that
have been included. Though the Conference Committee was able to mod-
erate the bill somewhat, it is still chock-full of what I considered to be bad
policy. Regardless of what one thinks of these provisions, they should have
received independent consideration and deliberation, rather than being
tied to, and slowing down, a need as pressing as AMBER.
); 149 CONG. Rsc. H3073 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of Rep. Delahunt)
I would like to be able to vote for this bill. It includes provisions that I
strongly support-including the "AMBER Alert" system that would aid in
finding missing children. But those children have been taken hostage by a
bill that also includes so-called "sentencing reforms"-radical, sweeping
changes to the Federal sentencing system that were never considered by
any committee of either House. Provisions that would cause an explosion
in the number of people behind bars-including many who simply do not
belong there.
); id. at H3072-73 (statement of Rep. Kilpatrick)
Mr. Speaker, It is vital that we implement AMBER Alert systems, not just in
our local communities, but nationwide. Our efforts to crack down on child
abductors and abusers will be fruitless if we cannot transcend state borders
(, *.. kly enough to catch these vicious criminals. I am in full support of a
national system that will provide for such coordination .... That is, how-
ever, not the only provision in this bill, Mr. Speaker .... After reviewing
the conference report, I did not see any substantive alterations or any elimi-
nation of these bad provisions, but rather I noticed additional provisions
that, again, hurt the livelihood of innocent individuals and legal acts. For
those reasons, Mr. Speaker, I vote "NO" on final passage of the conference
report and I will further expound on why I did so below .... I support the
need for an AMBER Alert system, but I do not support the conference
agreement in its entirety.
215 See id.
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phy-often obscene or harmful to minors." 216 At the same time, the
House Conference Report acknowledges that the Senate Report, pub-
lished less than two months earlier, did not contain the Truth in Do-
main Names Act or any analogous provision. 2 17
In debating the PROTECT Act, several members of Congress
balked at the additional tack-on provisions, including the Truth in Do-
main Names Act.2 18 From the Senate floor three days prior to the
passing of the PROTECT Act, Senator Leahy chastised the bill's spon-
sors and admonished:
[The Truth in Domain Names Act] has never been introduced in
the Senate, and received a grand total of 10 minutes of debate
before being passed as a floor amendment in the House. And in
case any judge is reading this and wondering, there was no discus-
sion of this provision during the one afternoon that the conference
committee actually met.2 19
In the House, Representative Jackson-Lee cautioned: "The Confer-
ence Report on [the PROTECT Act] has a myriad of provisions that
are unrelated to establishing a national AMBER Alert System."2 20
Nevertheless, despite the extraneous addenda, many members of
Congress voted in favor of the PROTECT Act, arguing that the costs
of delaying a national AMBER Alert System exceeded the benefits of
further resisting the eleventh-hour additions.22 1
216 H.R. CONF. REp. No. 108-66 at 66 (2003).
217 See id. at 65 (acknowledging that "[t]he Senate bill has no equivalent provision").
218 See supra note 214.
219 149 CONG. Rtc. 85147 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy). Sen.
Feinstein also pointed out that several provisions, including the Truth in Domain Names
Act, were tacked on to the PROTECT Act: "[The legislation] creates a Federal crime with a
2-year maximum penalty for creating a domain name with the intent to deceive a person
into viewing obscene material on the Internet. The maximum penalty is 4 years if the
intent is to deceive a minor." Id. at S5137 (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
220 149 CONG. REc. H3073 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee).
221 See, e.g., id. at H3074 (statement of Rep. Conyers) ("Unfortunately, the conference
was delayed and hung up by provisions which have nothing to do with Amber alert and
which should have been dealt with separately."); id. at H3073 (statement of Rep. Jackson-
Lee) (
I support the Conference Report on S. 151 reluctantly because while the
Conference Report improves upon the AMBER Alert system, it does not
provide us with a clean AMBER Alert Bill .... I firmly believe that all of the
provisions dealing with criminal justice matters should be debated in sepa-
rate legislation .. . [, but] [e]very day that goes by without a national AM-
BER Alert system in place puts the lives of children at risk .... I strongly
believe that the best way to save children's lives is to vote in support of the
PROTECT Act, even if I do so reluctantly.
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B. The Truth in Domain Names Act Survives Constitutional
Scrutiny
In passing the Truth in Domain Names Act, Congress deliberately
accounted for the Supreme Court's previous rejection of "unnecessa-
rily broad" statutes regulating the Internet and pornography, 222 and
recognized that while the First Amendment does not protect obscen-
ity or material deemed "harmful to minors,"223 legislation cannot re-
sult in "an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to
adults."224 Therefore, the Truth in Domain Names Act prohibits only
"misleading domain names on Web sites containing material 'harmful
to minors' [and it] would only limit unintentional access by adults to
such Web sites, and is not an unnecessarily broad restriction on
adults."225 Additionally, Congress recognized that the First Amend-
ment does not protect misleading speech.226 With these two lines of
First Amendment jurisprudence in mind, Congress concluded that
the Truth in Domain Names Act survives constitutional scrutiny be-
cause the suppression of speech addressed to adults is not unnecessa-
rily broad,227 and the Act targets only those domain names that are
misleading. 228
While Congress has faced substantial difficulty drafting a constitu-
tional statute regulating the Internet since 1996, the Truth in Domain
Names Act should survive scrutiny because it achieves its legislative
purpose without unnecessarily limiting adult speech. 229 Although the
Supreme Court recently mentioned the Truth in Domain Names Act
in passing, it has yet to pass on the constitutionality of the statute. 230
The First Amendment does not protect obscene material 23' or mate-
222 H.R. CONF. ReP. No. 108-66, at 65 (2003) (citing Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union,
521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997)). The Truth in Domain Names Act was drafted against a back-
drop of three Supreme Court decisions striking down congressional attempts to regulate
the ability of minors to access pornography on the Internet. See Goldstein, supra note 2, at
158; Praveen Goyal, Congress Fumbles with the Internet: Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. C1. 2329 (1997),
21 HARV. J. L. & PUB. PoL'Y 637, 641-52 (1998).
223 See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 635 (1968).
224 Reno, 521 U.S. at 875.
225 H.R. CON. REP. No. 108-66, at 65 (2003) (quoting Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 634).
226 Id at 66; see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) ("[T]here is
no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the care-
less error materially advances society's interest in 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' de-
bate on public issues.").
227 See Reno, 521 U.S. at 875.
228 See id. at 65-66.
229 See H.R. CON. REp. No. 108-66, at 65-66 (2003).
230 See Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2789-90 (2004).
231 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (concluding that "obscene material is
unprotected by the First Amendment"); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957)
("We hold that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or
press.").
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rial that is "harmful to minors."232 Even in cases in which "there is an
invasion of protected freedoms 'the power of the state to control the
conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over
adults."' 233 In a case involving the sale of pornographic magazines to
a minor, the Supreme Court concluded that a state statute which ac-
corded a "more restricted right [to minors] than that assured to
adults" survived constitutional scrutiny.234
Although Congress can constitutionally ban material harmful to
minors on the Internet, at the same time the regulation must not re-
sult in "an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to
adults. '2 35 In Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, the Supreme Court
struck down an overly broad statute that prohibited the transmission
of obscene or indecent communications to minors.2 36 Importantly,
the majority opinion distinguished a previous holding in Ginsberg v.
New York2 37 and reasoned that while a state could constitutionally re-
strict minor access to indecent material, it could not constitutionally
prevent adults from receiving it.238
Moreover, the scienter requirement of the Truth in Domain
Names Act further supports the conclusion that the statute passes con-
stitutional muster.23 9 Imposing liability only on those individuals who
"knowingly" use a misleading domain name, the Truth in Domain
Names Act avoids the strict liability regime that the Supreme Court
has cautioned could impermissibly chill protected speech.240
Based on this reasoning, subsection (b) of the Truth in Domain
Names Act passes constitutional muster because it only applies to (1)
misleading domain names (2) that are intended to deceive (3) a mi-
232 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 635 (1968).
233 Id. (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944)).
234 See id. at 637; see also id. at 636 ("Because of the State's exigent interest in prevent-
ing distribution to children of objectionable material, it can exercise its power to protect
the health, safety, welfare and morals of its community by barring the distribution to chil-
dren of books recognized to be suitable for adults." (quoting Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick,
18 N.Y.2d 71, 75 (1966))).
235 Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997); see also Goyal, supra
note 222, at 641-52 (discussing the Court's reasoning).
236 See id. at 874-75.
237 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
238 See id.
239 See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2252B(a)-(b) (Supp. 1 2003).
240 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347-48 (1974)
We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States
may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a pub-
lisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individ-
ual. This approach provides a more equitable boundary between the
competing concerns involved here. It recognizes the strength of the legiti-
mate state interest in compensating private individuals for wrongful injury
to reputation, yet shields the press and broadcast media from the rigors of
strict liability for defamation.
(citations omitted)).
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nor (4) into viewing material harmful to minors.2 41 The statute in-
cludes a definition of "material that is harmful to minors" thus
militating against a challenge for vagueness, and the definition paral-
lels the criteria the Court previously endorsed in Miller v. California.242
Subsection (a) presents a more challenging constitutional ques-
tion, but likely passes constitutional muster. Subsection (a) is not lim-
ited to minors, and applies to (1) misleading domain names (2) that
are intended to deceive (3) a person into viewing obscenity. Congress
reasoned that this section is constitutional because the First Amend-
ment does not accord full protection to misleading commercial
speech 243 within the framework of the Court's Central Hudson test.24 4
Unlike the Court's concern in Reno, the Truth in Domain Names Act
does not prevent adults from intentionally accessing pornographic ma-
terial. Rather, the Truth in Domain Names Act targets only inten-
tional deception which causes adults to come in contact with material
they did not affirmatively seek out.245
The Supreme Court's reasoning over three decades ago in Miller
rings true today in the typosquatting context: "States have a legitimate
interest in prohibiting dissemination or exhibition of obscene mate-
rial when the mode of dissemination carries with it a significant dan-
ger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling recipients or of exposure
to juveniles."24 6 Moreover, just as in Miller, typosquatting creates a sit-
uation in which "sexually explicit materials [are] thrust by aggressive
sales action upon unwilling recipients who had in no way indicated
any desire to receive such materials."24 7
IV
A SMALL STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION: THE LIMITED
SCOPE OF THE TRUTH IN DOMAIN NAMES ACT
Although Congress arguably passed the Truth in Domain Names
Act under false pretenses, the Act's novel approach to typosquatting is
241 See id. § 2252B(b).
242 See id. § 2252B(d); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-30 (1973).
243 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340.
244 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980). The Court has held that regulating deceptive or misleading speech is a permissi-
ble exercise of legislative authority. See Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976) (noting that nothing prohibits a state "from
insuring that the stream of commercial information flow cleanly as well as freely"); see also
Thompson v. Western States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002) (noting that the "thresh-
old" question under the Central Hudson test is "whether the commercial speech ...is
misleading").
245 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252B(a) (Supp. 1 2003).
246 Miller, 413 U.S. at 18-19.
247 Id. at 18.
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significant.248 Coupled with a possible $250,000 fine per domain
name registered, 249 the Act's potential four year prison sentence may
represent the deterrent required to solve the typosquatting epi-
demic. 250 At the same time, the Act's requirement that the deceptive
domain name contain obscene material leaves unregulated mislead-
ing domain names registered for non-obscene purposes.25 1 Conse-
quently, the Truth in Domain Names Act will not likely be the final
nail in the typosquatting coffin.
A. The Fall of the Notorious Typosquatter
In September 2003, the United States Attorney's Office in the
Southern District of New York filed the first criminal charges under
the Truth in Domain Names Act against John Zuccarini. 252 The com-
plaint outlines a comprehensive investigation spanning approximately
three months and alleges that Zuccarini acted "with the knowledge
that his activities cause confusion and deception among Internet
users, and with knowledge that his activities violate the rights of hold-
ers of existing domain names. '253 Further, the complaint states that
Zuccarini "combined mousetrapping techniques with other program-
ming tactics to bombard consumers with unwanted advertisements
for, among other things, pornography. 25 4
The Zuccarini case underscores the challenge of combating typo-
squatting under the law prior to the Truth in Domain Names Act:
Defendants faced liability only when plaintiffs filed civil suits, many
defendants did not respond to civil suits, and even if defendants did
respond and the suit was successfully litigated, the resulting penalties
were often insufficient to deter profitable typosquatting activity.255 In
prior civil actions, Zuccarini conceded that many of his domain names
were misspellings of domain names specifically associated with web
sites of interest to minors. 256 But Zuccarini's whereabouts were un-
248 See supra Part III.A.
249 See Zuccarini Plea, supra note 1, at 5.
250 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252B(b) (Supp. 1 2003).
251 See id.
252 See Mark Hamblett, First Charges Filed Under New Internet Porn Law: Statute Aimed at
Adult Sites Luring Children, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 4, 2003, at 1.
253 Sealed Complaint, supra note 86, at 9; see 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252B(b).
254 See Sealed Complaint, supra note 86, at 4 n.2.
255 See supra Part II.B. Zuccarini earned approximately $1 million per year. Zuccarini
Plea, supra note 1, at 5.
256 Sealed Complaint, supra note 86, at 5. In one case, the Internet corporation Yahoo!
received an e-mail from a parent whose thirteen-year-old daughter inadvertently misspelled
the domain name and was directed to a pornographic web site. Id. In another e-mail sent
to Yahoo!, a user who worked in an Internet-related business wrote: "I'm upset-and I'm in
the industry-so I understand if you make a mistake-my young daughter wanted to find
out about travel in Europe this summer so I suggested YAHOOTRAVEL. She typed Yahoo
Travel.com and got PORNO! . . . I'm very disappointed, I expect more from Yahoo." A
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known, he had no known address, and he "had a history of failing to
respond to complaints and deposition notices and of evading attempts
at service of process by federal marshals."25 7 Furthermore, in spite of
the several successful civil, arbitral, and regulatory actions against Zuc-
carini, he continued to register and use deceptive domain names.258
John Zuccarini's reign as the notorious typosquatter ended on
December 10, 2003 when he pleaded guilty to 49 counts of using a
misleading domain name under the Truth in Domain Names Act.259
Zuccarini was sentenced to 30 months in federal prison on February
26, 2004.260
B. The Scope of the Truth in Domain Names Act is Too Narrow
to Eliminate Typosquatting Altogether
While the Truth in Domain Names Act captured John Zuc-
carini26 I and likely survives constitutional scrutiny,26 2 the Act's re-
quirement that the deceptive domain name contain obscene material
fails to deter or punish typosquatters who register and use misleading
domain names for purposes other than exposing Internet users to ob-
scene material. 26 3 The Act will not affect typosquatters who divert In-
ternet users to an individual's own web site,264 bombard unsuspecting
users with advertisements for non-obscene products and services, 265 or
perpetrate consumer fraud.26 6 For example, the Truth in Domain
Names Act would not protect Carefirst Health Insurance against the
typosquatting activities of a pro-life advocacy organization that regis-
tered domain names deceptively similar to Carefirst's name in order
U.S. Postal investigation revealed that Yahoo! maintains a travel web site, but that its do-
main name is http://travel.yahoo.com and not http://www.yahootravel.com. Id. at 6.
257 Id. at 5.
258 See id. at 6-12; Edelman, supra note 26.
259 See Zuccarini Plea, supra note 1, at 5.
260 Press Release, United States Attorney, Southern District of New York, 'Cyberscam-
mer' Sentenced to 30 Months for Using Deceptive Internet Names to Mislead Minors to X-
Rated Sites (Feb. 26, 2004) (
Attorney General John Ashcroft stated: "Individuals who use trickery and
deceit to lure children to X-rated websites must know that they will pay a
price for their criminal conduct. The Truth in Domain Names Act was de-
signed to create a safer, cleaner online environment for children. As to-
day's sentence demonstrates, those who violate that law and expose
innocent children to pornography for their own financial gain will be pros-
ecuted, and they will serve time in jail.
), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/Press%20Releases/FEBRUARY04/zuccarini
%20sentence%20pr.pdf.
261 See Zuccarini Plea, supra note 1, at 4.
262 See supra Part III.B.
263 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252B (Supp. 1 2003).
264 See, e.g., Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 479-80 (3d Cir. 2001).
265 See, e.g., Shields v. Zuccarini, 89 F. Supp. 2d 634, 635 (E.D. Pa. 2000); Sealed Com-
plaint, supra note 86, at 4 n.2.
266 See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2252B(a), (b) (Supp. 1 2003).
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to misdirect users seeking the official Carefirst web site. 267 Nor would
the Act protect consumers against cyber-scammers, like the typosquat-
ter who registered the domain name www.attphonecard.com, a web
site unaffiliated with the telephone conglomerate AT&T, and fraudu-
lently solicited credit card information from web site visitors.268
As the previous examples illustrate, the Truth in Domain Names
Act is unlikely to eradicate all typosquatting activity. Moreover, even
in cases where the Act applies, it does not expressly require the defen-
dant forfeit the deceptively registered domain names.269 As a result,
each individual plaintiff must institute parallel civil proceedings to re-
cover the derivative domain names.
The limited scope and other shortcomings of the Act are most
likely attributable to the political climate and the pretenses under
which Congress passed the legislation. 2 70 Following the highly publi-
cized Elizabeth Smart abduction, Congress enacted the Truth in Do-
main Names Act as part of a package of legislation intended to protect
children.2 7' Thus, even though its application encompasses conduct
that does not concern children, Congress did not draft the Truth in
Domain Names Act as a measure to prevent consumer fraud as it did
the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act.2 72 Furthermore, as
the limited legislative history and vigorous Congressional floor de-
bates confirm, Congress did not discuss, draft, or develop the Truth in
Domain Names Act as thoroughly as it might have under different
political circumstances and with different objectives. 2 73
C. Typosquatting Solutions for the 21st Century
The previous section outlined the limitations of the Truth in Do-
main Names Act and the way in which its narrow scope leaves substan-
tial typosquatting activity unregulated. This section argues that
applying the Act and its criminal penalties to all typosquatting, as well
as revising the domain name registration process to require a prelimi-
267 See Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 393-95
(4th Cir. 2003) (involving a pro-life advocacy organization, that registered multiple domain
names similar to health insurance corporation's name and used the web sites to divert
Internet traffic to its own web site).
268 See Hearings, supra note 3, at 8 (prepared statement of Anne H. Chasser, President,
Int'l Trademark Ass'n).
269 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252B (Supp. 1 2003); 18 U.S.C. § 2253 (2000) (describing a
criminal forfeiture provision that does not apply to § 2252B).
270 See supra Part IIl.A. Congress has recently attempted to address the shortcomings
of the Truth in Domain Names Act. For example, on May 6, 2004, Representative Brady
introduced draft legislation broadening the scope of the statute to encompass misleading
meta tags in addition to domain names. See Children's Online Safety Act of 2004, H.R.
4305, 108th Cong. § 2 (2004).
271 See supra notes 200-07 and accompanying text.
272 See S. REP. No. 106-40 at 4 (1999).
273 See supra notes 222-26 and accompanying text.
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nary investigation into the registrant's right to use the requested do-
main name, will curb the typosquatting epidemic.
1. Apply the Truth in Domain Names Act to All Typosquatting
As Part I detailed, typosquatting is a highly profitable industry,
with some typosquatters earning millions of dollars per year. 274 Ex-
isting civil damages may be insufficient in light of the substantial ad-
vertising revenue typosquatting generates. 275 For example, when
Joseph Shields sued John Zuccarini for registering misspelled varia-
tions of the domain name joecartoon.com, the successful litigation
only netted $50,000 in damages. 276 Compared to Zuccarini's annual
income of approximately $1 million, $50,000 in civil damages is insig-
nificant.277 In short, civil litigation does not adequately deter typos-
quatters and future typosquatters because one loss in court does not
bankrupt the typosquatter either by removing all offending domain
names or by inflicting sufficient monetary damages. 278
The threat of several years imprisonment per deceptive domain
name will be a more effective deterrent than civil damages.279 Several
civil suits and hundreds of ICANN arbitration cases failed to curtail
John Zuccarini's typosquatting activities. 280 Today, Zuccarini sits be-
hind bars, and the legitimate entities he has plagued and the unsus-
pecting Internet users he tricked for the past decade are enjoying a
well-deserved respite. 281
Criminalizing typosquatting also eliminates the transaction costs
plaintiffs face when prosecuting fragmented litigation against an infi-
nite number of typosquatters. 282 Although Joseph Shields was success-
ful in his suit against Zuccarini for five infringing domain names,
Zuccarini owned nearly 9,000 domain names. 28 3 Under the ACPA,
the cost of losing an individual case is insignificant to a prolific typos-
quatter because he must transfer only those domain names that vio-
late the interests of the plaintiff.28 4
Moreover, while the ACPA provides for civil damages ranging
from $1,000 to $100,000 per domain name plus the discretionary
award of fees and costs, 28 5 smaller corporations and individuals are
274 See supra Part I.C.
275 See id.
276 See Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 481 (3d Cir. 2001).
277 See supra Part I.C.
278 See supra Part I.D, W.A.
279 See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
280 See supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
281 See supra notes 259-60 and accompanying text.
282 See supra Part II.B-C.
283 See supra note 190.
284 See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
285 See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(d) (2000); supra note 173 and accompanying text.
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unlikely to pursue civil cases. 28 6 Thus, while large corporations may
be able to absorb the costs of protracted litigation, criminal penalties
are necessary to guard against all typosquatting activity. Under the
Truth in Domain Names Act, a prosecutor can charge one defen-
dant-in one case-for all of the misleading domain names he regis-
tered regardless of who owns the legitimate domain name.28 7
Finally, forcing typosquatters to pay with their freedom instead of
their checkbook protects innocent Internet users. Individuals who
have been mousetrapped in a maze of flashing advertisements or who
have been subjected to unwanted pornographic images cascading
across their computer screens receive no remedy under the ACPA. 28 8
Thus, while the ACPA provides some remedy to successful plaintiffs, it
fails to provide the injured Internet user with any legal recourse. 289
Criminalizing typosquatting, on the other hand, protects Internet
users by empowering public prosecutors to pursue typosquatters in
the public interest, instead of relying on private claimants that will
likely be motivated by private, economic factors.
Consequently, increasing the scope of the Truth in Domain
Names Act to encompass all typosquatting-whether or not the deriv-
ative web site exposes the user to obscene material-may be the most
effective means of eliminating typosquatting. An expanded Truth in
Domain Names Act should also include a comprehensive forfeiture
provision that automatically transfers the misleading domain name to
the legitimate owner of the name.
2. Revise ICANN's Domain Name Registration Process
As outlined in Part I.B, domain name registrars do not indepen-
dently determine whether a registrant has the right to use a requested
domain name. 290 Although an individual must assert that he has the
right to use the domain name, that the requested name does not in-
jure any third party with respect to its trademark, and that he is not
seeking to use the domain name for any illegal purpose including un-
fair competition, typosquatters can easily disregard these
provisions. 291
Revising the domain name registration process to require an in-
dependent investigation before awarding the applicant a domain
name would prevent typosquatters from obtaining misleading domain
names in the first place. 292 Presently, applicants need only provide a
286 See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
287 See Zuccarini Complaint, supra note 19.
288 See supra Part II.B.
289 See supra Part II.B.
290 See supra Part I.B.
291 See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1998).
292 See supra Part I.B.
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credit card number and check a box accepting the registration
terms.293 While up-front investigations will likely prolong the registra-
tion process and result in higher fees and administrative costs, fewer
claimants would institute ICANN arbitration proceedings since the or-
ganization only arbitrates disputes concerning bad-faith registration
of domain names. 294
3. Expand ICANN's UDRP to Include a Prohibition Against
Mousetrapping
ICANN's UDRP currently prohibits the registration of domain
names with a bad-faith intent to profit off another's mark.2 95 Ex-
panding the UDRP to prohibit mousetrapping and web site program-
ming that corrupts web browsers would cripple typosquatters. 296
Without the ability to generate substantial advertising revenue, typos-
quatters would not have the financial incentive to register misleading
domain names.297 Consequently, creating a cause of action under the
UDRP to cancel domain names that employ mousetrapping tech-
niques would deal a heavy blow to typosquatters.
CONCLUSION
While Congress enacted the Truth in Domain Names Act as a
tool to protect children, the floor debates in both the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate confirm that Congress did not properly con-
sider and support the Act.2 98 On one hand, the Truth in Domain
Names Act was lauded as a core component of comprehensive legisla-
tion designed to enhance prosecutorial tools against the exploitation
of children. 299 On the other hand, the text of the statute permits the
government to prosecute defendants for conduct that does not in-
volve children or child pornography in any way. 300 Consequently, the
Act has the potential to serve as a prosecutorial sword against typo-
squatting, and not solely as a shield to safeguard children.
The Truth in Domain Names Act is the first legislation designed
to deter typosquatting in the first instance instead of merely providing
insufficient and backward-looking civil remedies. In this regard, the
statute is the most promising weapon against typosquatting to date.
Nevertheless, by limiting the scope of the Truth in Domain Names Act
and its criminal penalties only to instances in which the deceptive con-
293 See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
294 See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
295 UDRP, supra note 69, 4(b) (i).
296 See Orr & Ferrigno-Stack, supra note 20, at 474-75.
297 See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
298 See supra notes 221-25 and accompanying text.
299 Supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
300 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252B(a) (Supp. 1 2003).
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duct exposes Internet users to obscene material, the Act leaves unreg-
ulated a wide array of typosquatting activity that will continue to
plague unsuspecting Internet users. This narrow scope may, however,
be a product of the political climate in which it was passed and the
political incentives to protect children and combat obscenity. While
the pragmatic effects of the Truth in Domain Names Act remain to be
seen, its early success in the Zuccarini case suggests that the Act may
ultimately curtail typosquatting and serve as the model for future,
proactive legislation.
